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ALT-BARGAINING 
MICHAEL M. OSWALT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Reflections on the modern labor movement tend to take a bad-news/good-
news approach to the future: yes, unions are down, but a new trend suggests they 
are far from out.1 The framing is optimistic, but also right. What’s “new” has often 
involved innovations in unionizing, and over the past three decades organized 
labor has gotten creative, taken risks, and every once in a while—for the first time 
in a while—started winning. The new wave campaigns were variously 
“comprehensive,” legally canny, sometimes global, and usually movement-esque 
in their approach to traditionally underrepresented constituencies and sectors. 
Less discussed is that the trends developed counterparts: hot takes in 
unionization became new normals in negotiation. If exposing dirty directors 
weakened corporate resolve in union drives, C-suite exposés became a regular 
feature in contract drives. If union organizers learned that an employer’s fiercest 
anti-union weapons could be traded away during a campaign, contract organizers 
realized that a collective bargaining agreement could do the same for future 
campaigns. And if fighting for a union became less about money and more about 
morality, so did fighting for a contract. 
The current trend is “alt,” short for “alternative-labor,” and invoked where 
unions or non-profits mobilize workers for better working conditions but not 
necessarily collective bargaining. As its name implies, the efforts have varied 
origins, tactics, and aims, making the category hard to define with specificity.2 But 
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 1.  See, e.g., Lowell Turner, et al., Revival of the American Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE 
MOVEMENT: LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1, 5 (Lowell Turner et al., eds. 
2001) (describing “the richness of innovation now under way within the American labor movement”); 
RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK: REMAKING THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 175 
(2004) (“[H]owever weak its relational position may be, ‘labor’ has begun to conjure up an entirely 
different vision, as a constellation of groups, institutions, and movements [that might] overcome the 
formidable obstacles to achieving significant social power in American society.”); Ruth Milkman, 
Toward a New Labor Movement? in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 1, 22 (Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014) (describing recent union 
and non-union advocacy efforts that could “incubat[e] a generation of new labor activists and new labor 
movement organizational forms”). 
 2.  For some recent attempts to classify alt-labor organizations based on legal status, size, and 
function, see Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization Cooperation, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1480–94 (2016); Dayne Lee, Bundling ‘Alt-Labor,’ Note, 51 HARV. C.R.-
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if the alt-labor innovations of today signal how more mature entities—alt-, 
traditional, or otherwise—will push for workplace benefits tomorrow, clarifying 
what the present advance is, exactly, is useful foreshadowing. 
That definitional project is one goal of this article. Alt-labor is incredibly 
diverse, but through-lines exist. Its constituent groups are repeatedly marked by 
three non-standard relationships to law that generate exceptional conceptions of 
group membership, challenge organizing’s presumptive outer-bounds, and prove 
how even bad organizing doctrine can be harnessed for good. 
The major goal, though, is to argue that alt-labor isn’t foreshadowing 
anything because alt-bargaining is here. Over and over, the unconventional legal 
orientations that facilitate alt-labor’s inclusive approaches to membership, fluid 
conceptions of which workers or what entities are organizable, and optimistic 
spins on employment rights can be spotted in recent campaigns where the 
activists are already assembled and scrutiny instead surrounds how the group is 
negotiating. The innovative legal perspectives that make up alternative 
organizing practices, in other words, can now be found in situations where labor 
and management are actually passing proposals. 
I make this case through a series of narratives. The Chicago Teachers Union 
has a storied history, but in 2012 it demanded things it had no right to demand 
and shattered the definition of union “membership” in the process. Teachers in 
West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, North Carolina, and Kentucky had unions 
but no right to bargain and no right to strike. Last spring, they crashed those legal 
gaps by walking out, yelling out, and winning out anyway. Unions in Colorado 
and Minnesota took laws passed to limit bargaining power, embraced them, and 
landed more leverage than ever. Together, the stories may seem to suggest the 
beginnings of a new brand of bargaining. My claim is that set against alt-labor, 
the methods are not really new. They’re just “alternative.” 
To an extent, alt-bargaining resonates with other recent advancements in 
benefit negotiations. Like last year’s southern-state teacher strikes, campaigns to 
set wages, leave, or other standards through tri-partite administrative boards also 
shift discussions to atypical, uniquely political—and especially public—settings.3 
Attempts to use joint-employment and other theories to establish working 
conditions by sector4 showcase a sense that gloomy legal assumptions can be 
brightened, the same ethic that fuels the Denver and St. Paul union stories 
reviewed later. 
The more obvious overlap is with the so-called “bargaining for the common 
good” (BCG) approach to negotiations, which prioritizes community-centric 
demands. The model is central to how the Chicago Teachers Union conceives of 
its membership—each and every city resident—and, accordingly, how it develops 
proposals to cover that membership. In fact, to varying degrees, a commitment 
 
C.L. L. REV. 509, 516–20 (2016).   
 3.  Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 2, 64–66 (2016).  
 4.  Id. at 29–32.  
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to extend benefits beyond whatever would be considered the usual bargaining 
“unit” runs through every campaign detailed here. 
What gives alt-bargaining promise is the insight that the sustainability of its 
three legal orientations rest on how members and non-members come to 
understand that commitment. Putting far-reaching but haphazardly developed 
demands on the table could be understood by the public as a cheap ploy. The 
proposals  might get mocked and dismissed by employers, spark internal member 
resentments, or be easily traded off for something like vacation time, alienating 
or angering outside supporters. An illegal strike in support of demands that fail 
to energize unionists or the community could be disastrous. 
The takeaway from the case studies is that none of this is happening. A 
contract proposal has always been a collection of interests, and alt-bargaining has 
revealed that when interests are viewed more as relational opportunities than 
coalitional glue, the interests—and the number of seats on the union side of the 
table—expand. With time, intention, and practice, even a multiplicity of cabined, 
individualistic, “self”-interested goals can become common. From there, 
bargaining’s nature changes along the lines suggested by a saying that’s been 
making the rounds in movement circles: “Community is the new density.”5 That 
is, the conventional power equation asks, “Who’s got a contract?”6 Alt-
bargaining asks, “Who’s in your contract?” 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II canvasses evolutions in organizing 
since the 1970s to show how innovations that start at the unionization phase don’t 
stay there. Corporate, comprehensive, and social movement advances all became 
mainstay bargaining strategies. While the present breakthrough, alt-labor, defies 
easy characterization, Part II tries based on its three exceptional relationships to 
law. Part III addresses the next question: when and how might alt-labor’s legal 
insights begin to reverberate in later stages of organizing. After identifying the 
existing echoes, I argue that time is now. 
Part IV explores mechanics. Embedded in alt-bargaining’s three new legal 
orientations is a sophisticated understanding of interest formation that allows the 
campaigns to press for broad, “common good”-type community benefits with 
minimal outside conflict, minimal internal dissension, and—most critically—
draw big crowds. In doing so, leaders use practices steeped in community-based 
activism that incorporate months of transformational political and relational 
education. As Gabe Winant has described, unions’ modern challenge is to get the 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, Labor Goes Community AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 9, 2013) 
(“‘Community is the new density,’ AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Elizabeth Shuler said yesterday, just 
moments before the labor federation’s quadrennial convention was gaveled to order in Los Angeles.”); 
VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKER’S UNIONS: REBUILDING LABOR FROM BELOW 214 (2016) (“[T]he 
change in thinking was epitomized by the slogan of AFT president Randi Weingarten, ‘Community is 
the new density!’”).  
 6.  Union “density” refers to the percentage of unionized workers in a geographical location. 
Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 326 (2012).  
As “a key measure of labor union power and influence,” it has traditionally been “the main concern of 
the American labor movement . . . to reverse its decades-long decline.” Id. at 326–27.  
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nurse, custodian, fast-food worker—and, increasingly, Uber driver—to 
“understand their fates as intertwined.”7 The realities of “race, economic 
position, and social status,” can make the task feel intractable.8 Alt-bargaining’s 
approach suggests it’s not impossible. 
Finally, Part V offers a vision of alt-bargaining’s ambitions, plus a slate of 
legal and structural reforms—especially the introduction of community “pool 
voting”—that might support them. Part VI briefly concludes. 
II 
LABOR ORGANIZING IN TWO PHASES 
When workers unionize, it is frequently a headline-grabbing event. It doesn’t 
happen very often, and the law’s failure to check employer hostilities during the 
process make for a good underdog story.9 Less covered, and generally less 
studied,10 is what comes next. The infant union must campaign anew, this time for 
a contract. 
The tactics and strategies involved in this second phase of organizing are as 
important as the first. The law does not require that employers agree to anything, 
and about 50% of the time they don’t, leaving workers more frustrated and 
disillusioned than before.11 From there, the union frequently dissolves.12 
Though the goals are technically different—employee acceptance of a group 
representative, first, then employer acceptance of the representative’s 
demands—from an organizing perspective the phases are intimately connected 
and even reflect on each other. Studies show that the best practices for union-
building are the best practices for contract-building,13 that employee activism in 
the union phase correlates with employee activism in the negotiation phase,14 and 
that workers’ perceptions of the union’s bargaining prowess affects their 
willingness to fight for it in the first place.15 
 
 7.  Gabriel Winant, Who Works for the Workers, 26 N+1 (Fall 2016), 
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-26/essays/who-works-for-the-workers/ [https://perma.cc/683L-4NDN].  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Paul Weiler’s seminal critique of the NLRB election process has stood the test of time. Paul 
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1769, 1774–1816 (1983).   
 10.  Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Evolution of Strategic and Coordinated Bargaining 
Campaigns in the 1990s, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 211, 211 (Lowell Turner et al., eds. 2001); LINDA MARKOWITZ, WORKER ACTIVISM 
AFTER SUCCESSFUL UNION ORGANIZING 6 (2000).  
 11.  Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and EFCA, 70 LA. L. REV. 47, 
47, 54–55 (2009). 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Kate Bronfenbrenner, Lasting Victories: Successful Union Strategies for Winning First Contracts, 
PROCEEDINGS 48TH ANNUAL MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH ASSOC. 161, 161–62, 166 (1996).  
 14.  MARKOWITZ, supra note 10, at 160–62, 176. 
 15.  Steven H. Lopez, Overcoming Legacies of Business Unionism, in REBUILDING LABOR: 
ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT 114, 117, 124–25 (Ruth Milkman & 
Kim Voss eds., 2004).  
89 - BOOK PROOF - OSWALT - ALT-BARGAINING (DO NOT DELETE) 8/14/2019  10:08 AM 
No. 3 2019] ALT-BARGAINING 93 
An interplay can also be spotted in practice, over time. Labor’s early history 
was marked by broad-based organizing for broadly-applicable goals, like the 
Knights of Labor’s vision for a “worker’s republic”16 with every race, sex, and 
skill subsumed in struggles for employment and community justice.17 By the late-
nineteenth century, that ambition had been eclipsed by the rise of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and a reverse commitment to craft-based, racially-
exclusionary organizing and narrowly job-based, non-political demands.18 
Treatments of this turn to what is often called “volunteerism” or “business 
unionism” could fill a small library and point to its enduring legacy.19 By the 
1960s, labor was insular, out-of-step with movement politics, and content to coast 
on its then-historic size.20 New organizing had effectively stopped and bargaining 
had become comparatively passive, with demands often “patterned”21 or granted 
perfunctorily.22 When the UAW’s Walter Reuther, a key dissenter, pleaded with 
AFL president George Meany to help bring millions of marginalized workers 
into the union fold, Meany responded: “Well, good luck with that one.”23 
Luck, though, was in short supply. In the 1970s and ‘80s, deindustrialization, 
deregulation, recessions, and filibuster-protected employer aggressions helped 
chop unionization rates in half.24 Collective bargaining, likewise, became 
“concession” bargaining, with wages and benefits routinely crashing through 
previously agreed-to floors, sometimes with dubious financial justification.25 
The period was, as labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein has described it, a 
“disaster.”26 But it also sparked a basic re-appraisal of organizing’s substance—
the essentials of union campaigns and the fundamentals of contract fights. In 
retrospect, the results can be roughly arranged as trends emerging over the last 
few decades: from an initial change in campaign tactics; to a shift in rhetorical 
 
 16.  LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN’S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 228 (1983). 
 17.  ELIZABETH FAUE, COMMUNITY OF SUFFERING AND STRUGGLE 6–7 (1991).  
 18.  Marion Crane, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1774-78 (2001). The AFL’s 
orientation stands in contrast to its early competitor and later partner, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO). See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly? 114 MICH. L. REV. 
169, 180 n. 52 (2015).   
 19.  See Catherine Fisk, Still “Learning Something of Legislation”: The Judiciary in the History of 
Labor Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 151, 159, 184 (1994) (canvassing the literature and analyzing 
volunteerism’s persistence and modern consequences).  
 20.  NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 185-91 
(2002). See also Katherine V.W. Stone, The Steelworkers’ Trilogy: The Evolution of Labor Arbitration, 
in LABOR LAW STORIES 149, 187 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk, eds., 2005) (“By 1970, the labor 
movement found itself isolated from the rest of American society.”).  
 21.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 20, at 127–28. 
 22.  JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, AND 
PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS 10–11 (1999). 
 23.  Robert Zieger, George Meany, in LABOR LEADERS IN AMERICA 324, 342 (Melvyn Dubofsky 
& Warren Van Tine eds., 1987).  
 24.  JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1, 10-30 (2014).  
 25.  Charles Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises Upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 56 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 465, 475–78 (1988).  
 26.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 20, at 213. 
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frames and legal strategies; to, most recently, a restructuring of the movement’s 
relationship to the law. 
A. Tactics: Corporate and Comprehensive Campaigns 
Labor’s first advance was to expand the universe of pressures brought to bear 
on employer intransigence. Through so-called “corporate campaigns,” unions 
sought to transform a contained fight between an employer and a union into a 
messier—and personalized—affair risking executives’ relationships and 
reputations. The strategy is commonly linked to “maverick campaigner” Ray 
Rogers, hired by the Amalgamated Clothing Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) 
in 1976 to boost a decade-long effort to unionize southern textile giant J.P. 
Stevens.27 In an unconventional move, Rogers launched a “campaign of 
exposure” on Stevens’ Board of Directors, using letter-writing, street protests, 
shareholder resolutions, and faith-based denouncements to shame directors’ 
various corporate entanglements.28 Publicizing the board’s unsavory alliances 
with alleged anti-worker, anti-women companies like New York Life, Seamen’s 
Bank, and Avon cosmetics led to a stunning five resignations and neutralized 
Stevens’ presumed business allies.29 
With Stevens settled in 1980 (and later memorialized in the Oscar-winning 
film Norma Rae),30 the approach seeped into the bargaining arena. Rogers-style 
reveals of incestuous business ties got tacked onto contract fights at Phelps-
Dodge and Browne & Sharpe and then took centerstage during protracted strike 
and lockout negotiations at Hormel,31 International Paper,32 and Staley.33 
While most of the corporate campaign-infused fights ended unfavorably, if 
not terribly,34 expanding the universe of pressure points showed enough promise 
that labor opted to build on the strategy instead of abandoning it. The new 
buzzwords were “coordinated” or “comprehensive,” and organizing would now 
be multi-directional: on and off the clock, in the community, between executive 
suites, and, if necessary, across the globe.35 The Union of Needletrades, Industrial 
 
 27.  TIMOTHY MINCHIN, “DON’T SLEEP WITH STEVENS!”: THE J.P. STEVENS CAMPAIGN AND THE 
STRUGGLE TO ORGANIZE THE SOUTH, 1963-1980, 122–23 (2005). 
 28.  Id. at 123–26. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Megan Rosenfeld, Through the Mill with Crystal Lee and ‘Norma Rae,’ WASH. POST (Jun. 11, 
1980).  
 31.  TOM JURAVICH & KATE BRONFENBRENNER, RAVENSWOOD: THE STEELWORKERS’ 
VICTORY AND THE REVIVAL OF AMERICAN LABOR 70 (1999). 
 32.  Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry 
Example, 102 YALE L. J. 1803, 1831–33 (1993). 
 33.  STEVEN ASHBY & C.J. HAWKING, STALEY: THE FIGHT FOR A NEW AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 37–39 (2009). 
 34.  At International Paper and Hormel, workers lost the strike, many lost their jobs, and all lost the 
union. Getman & Marshall, supra note 32, at 1835–36; PETER RACHLEFF, HARD-PRESSED IN THE 
HEARTLAND: THE HORMEL STRIKE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 3–4 (1999).  
 35.  JURAVICH & BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 31, at 71–72; Rob Hickey, Strategic Contract 
Campaigns at Multinational Corporations, 27 LAB. STUDIES J. 71, 72–73 (2002). 
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and Textile Employees’ (UNITE) 1994 plan to organize Guess—then the 
“colossus” of L.A.’s apparel manufacturing scene—is representative, mixing 
sophisticated corporate research with a “ground war” (unfair labor practice 
strikes and community alliances), an “air war” (a media- and celebrity-fueled 
boycott), and rhetoric culled from the ascendant international anti-sweatshop 
movement.36 Contract organizing became a mirror image. Scholars identified a 
“true evolution” in bargaining weapons across the decade, shifting from the 
corporate campaign’s reputational approach to a varied arsenal of external 
alliances, safety and environmental charges, striker mortgage cooperatives, and 
overseas lobbying.37 
B. Frames and Legal Ingenuities: Social Movement Unionism 
A second trend surfaces from some of these later-stage comprehensive 
campaigns, which couched union and contract struggles not in terms of money or 
power but “as a moral issue demanding a response.”38 Such values-based framing 
sought to stretch the circle of solidarity and reanimate the “movement” side of 
labor’s historic arc.39 Through marches and street theatrics, with clergy and 
politicians ratifying the message, union campaigns like the Service Employees 
International Union’s (SEIU) “Justice for Janitors,” and contract campaigns like 
the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union’s (HERE) “Hotel 
Workers Rising,” emphasized “the community’s stake in [their] organizing 
success.”40 
That these and similar efforts also unionized and won gains for thousands is 
a testament to a simultaneous commitment to legal innovation. Where the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) “certifies” unions only through 
secret-ballot elections,41 “social movement unionism” relied on voluntary 
recognition and a petition system the Supreme Court blessed as an alternative in 
the 1960s.42 Where the NLRA bans “coercive” pressure on parties peripherally 
involved in union fights, Justice for Janitors thrived on creative pressure courts 
usually deemed within the law’s theoretical limits.43 And where the law 
 
 36.  RUTH MILKMAN, L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. LABOR 162–
69 (2006).  
 37.  BRONFENBRENNER & JURAVICH, supra note 10, at 234, 220-22, 228-29.  
 38.  STEVEN HENRY LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST BELT: AN INSIDE STUDY OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 114, 153 (2004).  
 39.  RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK: REMAKING THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
130–31 (2004).  
 40.  Id. at 142-43; JULIUS GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT 
132–33 (2010) [hereinafter RESTORING THE POWER]. 
 41.  29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (empowering the National Labor Relations Board to “direct an 
election by secret ballot and . . . certify the results thereof”). 
 42.  FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 39, at 129. See also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 
575–76 (1969).  
 43.  Catherine L. Fisk, et al., Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in Southern California, in 
ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199, 
214–24 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000).  
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greenlights anti-union speech, unions negotiated private employer agreements 
that limited its substance and intensity.44 
Bargaining, too, remodeled analogously. HERE and SEIU shrewdly reduced 
or escalated tensions by strategically “triggering” bargaining obligations (and the 
associated risk of cost spikes or strikes) at times convenient—or extremely 
inconvenient—for employers.45 Many unions began “bargaining to organize,” 
using contract negotiations to facilitate unionization at different or future 
employer locations.46 Others used politics to conjure bargaining partners for 
publicly-funded childcare and homecare workers out of state law.47 
These and other advances were real, important, and captivated legal 
commentators.48 But density still dropped.49 With statutory reform off the table, 
many advocates came to believe that legal resourcefulness was not enough and 
that labor needed to revolutionize its relationship with the law entirely.50 That 
surrogate vision became known as “alt-labor,” and it marks organizing’s current 
era. 
C. Law: Alt-Labor 
The term alt-labor tends to refer to organizing efforts aimed at improving 
working conditions primarily through avenues other than collective bargaining.51 
Because unions support and even fund many alt-groups and alt-campaigns, 
marking where “traditional” labor ends and alt-labor begins can be debatable. 
But in terms of organizing, definitions are less important than the descriptive fact 
that the very rise of “alternative” campaigns signals a shift in labor’s orientation 
with the law. The change reverberates in the movement’s current approach to 
membership, jurisdiction, and legal doctrine itself. 
1. Law and Membership 
Running parallel to social movement unionism’s heyday was a near-obsessive 
internal focus on reversing the ever-dwindling number of U.S. union members. 
In 1995, the concern prompted what was viewed as a radical shake-up at the top 
of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO).52 A decade later it led six unions to split-off and form a new 
 
 44.  Benjamin Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1153, 1169–72 (2011). 
 45.  RESTORING THE POWER, supra note 40, at 131–32; Benjamin Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379 (2007). 
 46.  Dorothee Benz, Organizing to Survive, Bargaining to Organize, 6 WORKINGUSA 95, 95 (2002).  
 47.  Peggy Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care in State Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1403–
05 (2008).   
 48.  Sachs, supra note 44, at 394 (predicting potentially “enormous returns”).  
 49.  Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 2–3. 
 50.  See, e.g., David Rolf, Alternative Futures for Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 12, 2012) ([W]e’ll be 
remembered—or won’t be—for whether we had the vision to reallocate our resources and our talent on 
a massive scale to create a new model for worker advocacy.”).  
 51.  Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013).  
 52.  Peter Kilborn, Militant Elected Head of A.F.L-C.I.O., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 1995). 
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federation.53 When it came to “how-tos,” theoretical camps arose and internecine 
feuds proceeded.54 
“Membership” in this context meant workers paying dues to unions certified 
or recognized under the NLRA, holding democratic rights under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, and reported to the Department of 
Labor.55 That has changed. Alt-labor membership is affective, not bureaucratic. 
Law remains a key feature, but as a tool that sows solidarity, not an encumbrance 
that triggers procedures. So, when in early 2013 the AFL-CIO’s President 
implored leaders to “stop letting the law define who our members should be,”56 
he likely had things like the Organization United for Respect (OUR) Walmart, 
a United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)-funded project, in mind. 
Sharing only the same massive anti-union employer and the courage to invoke 
NLRA Section 7, which protects most workplace protests,57 OUR Walmart 
backers were “members” in activism only.58 Collective rights assertion, like 
demonstrations over pregnancy accommodations, doubled as membership 
orientation.59 
SEIU’s still-active Fight for $15 (FF15) is even more ambitious. Like OUR 
Walmart, FF15 membership is a function of action, usually short strikes that 
would be classic insubordination but for basic labor law.60 But unlike OUR 
Walmart, FF15’s first target was an industry (fast food), and it has since expanded 
its sights to any job paying less than $15 an hour.61 The universe of potential 
members is therefore massive, but it’s based on a theory that has paid dividends: 
 
 53.  Rachel Aleks, Estimating the Effect of “Change-To-Win” on Organizing, 68 INDUST. & LAB. 
RELATIONS REV. 584, 585 (2015).  
 54.  See, e.g., Max Fraser, Labor’s Conundrum: Growth vs. Standards, 18 NEW LAB. FORUM 48 
(2009). 
 55.  See Thomas Edsall, Two Top Unions Split From AFL-CIO, WASH. POST (Jul 26, 2005) (citing 
“distress over . . . the AFL-CIO’s ineffectiveness in stopping the long-term decline in union membership 
and . . . density.”). See also NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (interpreting union 
“membership” in the National Labor Relations Act); U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of Labor-Management 
Standards, 73 Stat. 519-546 (1959) (describing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959, which “grants certain rights to union members and protects their interests by promoting democratic 
procedures”); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC 
NEWS RELEASE, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (Jan. 18, 2019) (reporting the “union membership rate”).  
 56.  Michael Bologna, Trumka Calls on Labor To Adapt New Models of Representation, DAILY LAB. 
REP. (Mar. 7, 2013).  
 57.  NLRB v. Washington Alum., 370 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1962).  
 58.  Josh Eidelson, Walmart Workers Plan Widespread, Massive Strikes, NATION (Sep. 6, 2013).   
 59.  Amien Essif, Walmart’s Inhumane Policies for Pregnant Workers, WORKING IN THESE TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2014) (describing the origins of the UFCW-funded, OUR Walmart-organized, “Respect the 
Bump” campaign, which “established a list of demands to present to Walmart, including to comply 
immediately with the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act and to craft a store policy in line with the 
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, a more progressive bill pending in Congress”).   
 60.  See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Fast-food workers strike, seeking $15 wage, political muscle, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/11/10/fast-food-strikes-
begin/75482782/ [https://perma.cc/3DBT-PQX6]. 
 61.  Steven Greenhouse & Jana Kasperkevic, Fight for $15 Swells into Largest Protest by Low-Wage 
Workers in US History, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2015). 
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workers strike because they see others strike and return to work tell about it.62 
The law’s protective cloak is, in practice, also the recruitment program. 
 Other recent union-backed efforts are not even linked to employers, like 
UnitedNY’s 330,000 door-to-door canvass in low-income neighborhoods. 
Leadership defines the group’s membership simply as “folks that are willing to 
take action,”63 a box that gets checked the first time someone shows up to any of 
the many rallies UnitedNY organizes in support of progressive law reforms, like 
more millionaire taxes or less train troubles.64 That UnitedNY ultimately fused 
its work with Occupy Wall Street’s 2011 come-one-come-all park insurgency 
highlights this capacious conception of membership. It also points to the second 
common element of alt-efforts: organizing beyond borders.65 
2. Law and Jurisdiction 
Of labor law’s many organizing restrictions, its coverage exclusions may have 
done the most to stunt the movement’s long-term character.66 The NLRA has 
always limited unions’ geographic, demographic, and equitable reach by 
disqualifying agricultural and in-home workers.67 Later revisions walling off 
“supervisors” diced the organizing universe considerably while redefining the 
very nature of the “working class” and labor’s relationship to it.68 Today, as  the 
gig economy expands in numbers and consciousness,69 the law’s potential neglect 
of the developments through the independent contractor exception70 reads like a 
bad sociological joke. 
But alt-labor thrives in breaches, and now questions of jurisdiction—which 
workers are organizable—feel much less constrained by law. In Florida’s tomato 
fields, stark statutory voids have been filled by the unincorporated, effectively 
leaderless Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ campaign of shame and boycotts to 
pressure 90% of the industry to adhere voluntarily to a wide-ranging Code of 
Conduct and complaint, audit, and sanction system.71 In New York, the fledgling 
Domestic Workers United convened a “Having Your Say” assembly of nannies, 
 
 62.  Id. at 644.  
 63.  Lynne Turner, United New York, in NEW LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 88, 96-97 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2014).  
 64.  Id. at 98, 100.  
 65.  Id. at 104–05. 
 66.  See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 20, at 118.  
 67.  Juan Perea, Echos of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural and Domestic 
Worker Exclusion in the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 95 (2011).  
 68.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 20, at 119.  
 69.  A recent government study concluded that the percentage of “alternative-work-arrangements” 
has remained steady, surprising many and focusing new attention on a broader survey from 2015 that 
found a significant rise. Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jun. 7, 2018).   
 70.  29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Whether gig workers are, in fact, “independent contractors” is of course 
hotly contested. See Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers Are Contractors, Not Employees, Labor Board Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019) (citing critics of the Board’s conception of independent contractor status). 
 71.  Manoj Dias-Abey, Justice in Our Fields: Can ‘Alt-Labor’ Organizations Improve Migrant Farm 
Workers’ Conditions?, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 167, 197–205 (2018).  
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cleaners, and personal assistants to document the financial and family havoc 
caused by the legal vacuum at the heart of the homecare industry.72 Seven years 
of stories, advocacy, and lobbying later, a domestic worker “Bill of Rights” 
statute filled it with state wage, rest, and harassment protections.73  Today 
organizers target independent contractors whether their status is largely accepted 
(cab drivers)74 or hotly contested (Uber drivers).75 Both even strike.76 
Perhaps the most telling exemplars of alt-labor’s willingness to organize in the 
absence of clear—or any—law come from worker centers, clinic-like 
organizations that use direct action and legal and policy advocacy to enforce and 
enhance workplace rights.77 All of it rests on a foundational interest in organizing 
workers outside of labor law.78 The law’s picketing, servicing, and administrative 
strictures generally apply where entities repeatedly push for “bilateral” talks, and 
worker centers, reliant on creative protests, fluid pressure points, and shoestring 
budgets, know to make demands discrete and discussion one-sided.79  Here—and 
only here—expanding the Act’s coverage is a recurrent corporate priority.80 
Yet, like the rest of alt-labor, in many other instances worker centers see law 
as a potent organizing—and dignifying—resource. This quality is the third and 
final signifier of alt-labor’s reorienting influence. 
3. Law and Legal Empowerment 
Behind much of the legal innovation associated with the social movement 
unionism period was a sense that labor law, as traditionally conceived, had failed. 
The statute’s remedial scheme made even adjudicated illegalities a cost of doing 
business, and the Board’s representation procedures created substantial gaps 
between employee preferences and bureaucratic outcomes.81 Expressed 
sentiments swung between cynicism and despair.82 
 
 72.  Harmony Goldberg, “Prepare to Win,” in Milkman & Ott, supra note 1, at 274. 
 73.  Id. at 274–79.  
 74.  Lizzie Widdicombe, Thin Yellow Line, NEW YORKER (Apr. 18, 2011).  
 75.  Alan Feuer, Uber Drivers Against the App, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016).  
 76.  Widdicombe, supra note 74; Janet Burns, Uber and Lyft Drivers Strike in LA After Yet Another 
Uber Pay Cut, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2019/03/25/uber-and-
lyft-drivers-strike-in-la-after-yet-another-pay-cut/#76eb04326e41 [https://perma.cc/AK8D-L8FS]. 
 77.  Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Labor Law, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 232, 241–42 (2009). 
 78.  Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW 37, 44-
45 (Guy Davidov, ed. 2006). See also Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 1879, 1893 (2007) (“Worker centers have been innovative at the margins of the field, 
outside of the bureaucratic strictures and biases of unions and the regulatory regime established by 
business and government to contain labor organizing.”).  
 79.  NLRB ADVICE MEMORANDUM, ROC-NY, 2-CP-1067 ET AL., 1–9, Nov. 30, 2006. 
 80.  Ben Penn & Jacquie Lee, ‘Worker Center or Union’ Probe Sign of Things to Come, BLOOMBERG 
B.N.A. (Mar. 15, 2018).   
 81.  See, e.g., PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 44 (1990) (describing a “yawning representation gap”).  
 82.  See, e.g., James Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory 
Aging Process, 74 N. C. L. REV. 939, 942 (1996) (noting commentators deeming the Act “largely 
irrelevant to the contemporary workforce”); Michael Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a 
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By nature, alt-labor seeks non-standard forms of empowerment, and with that 
has come a more auspicious take on the law. While a vast socio-legal literature 
has developed around questions of how legal consciousness affects activism,83 
worker centers have taken a position: the correlation is positive, and in most 
situations law—limits, flaws, and all—is couched as a dignifying force.84 
In Chicago, worker centers pushed for a panoply of domestic worker rights—
like minimum bedroom sizes and dedicated refrigerator space—that state 
officials warned would be practically unenforceable.85 Leaders and activists 
forged ahead with a sense that much of law’s value is existential.86 Even paper 
rights devolve workplace control.87 Even weak rights “acknowledge[] the 
claimant’s membership in the larger group.”88 And even rights-talk “encourages 
a group to understand its vision of justice in a particular way.”89 For worker 
centers, law’s elixir of agency, inclusion, and righteousness make it a leveraging, 
motivating force.90 
Beyond worker centers, FF15 would not exist without a baseline faith in 
Section 7’s integrity that can be conveyed to vulnerable employees. Organizers 
push its protection of “concerted activities” to workers in strike kits and to 
employers in strike notices.91 “We know striking works,” the campaign’s website 
reads, before pulling inspiration straight from the Act: “[W]e don’t win because 
politicians or companies decide out of the goodness of their hearts to give us 
raises. We win because workers stand together to make them give us what we 
deserve.”92 
FF15 takes this position fully cognizant of the law’s remedial holes. No striker 
returns to work absent a scrum of local leaders reminding employers that the 
community is watching.93  Likewise, rampant, unchecked wage theft94 does not 
diminish the campaign’s faith in wage and hour laws. For Fight for $15, the 
eponymous benchmark is ennobling as much for its impact on rent as for its 
 
Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993).   
 83.  Dias-Abey, supra note 71, at 176.  
 84.  JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 150, 179–
80 (2005). César Rosado Marzán’s field research emphasizes this point. César F. Rosado Marzán, Dignity 
Takings and Wage Theft, 92 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1218–19 (2017). 
 85.  Michael M. Oswalt & César Rosado Marzán, Organizing the State: The ‘New Labor Law’ Seen 
from the Bottom-Up, 39 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 415, 454–55 (2018); Interview with ARISE Chi. 
Staffer, in Chi., Ill (March 3, 2017). 
 86.  Oswalt & Rosado Marzán, supra note 85, at 455. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J. 1860, 1874 (1987).  
 89.  GORDON, supra note 84, at 179. 
 90.  Oswalt & Rosado Marzán, supra note 85, at 455.  
 91.  29 U.S.C. § 157; Fight For $15, For Workers, How to go on strike, https://fightfor15.org/for-
workers/ [https://perma.cc/8ANE-DW2M]. 
 92.  Fightfor$15, Why We Strike, https://fightfor15.org/why-we-strike/ [https://perma.cc/Y6GK-
4CQT].  
 93.  FightFor$15, For Workers, Walkbacks, https://fightfor15.org/for-workers/ (“When workers in 
the FF15 strike, we always make sure we don’t return to work alone.”).  
 94.  Marianne Levine, Behind the minimum wage fight, failure to enforce, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2018).   
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shared, righteous vision for marginalized people.95 The definitive long-form 
account of the campaign is simply titled, “Dignity.”96 
III 
ALT-BARGAINING 
Alt-labor groups, campaigns, and strategies are likely to proliferate and 
comprise the bulk of labor movement commentary and scholarly analysis for the 
foreseeable future.97 Unexplored, however, is how the current evolution may 
reverberate in other, later stages of the organizing timeline. The course of U.S. 
labor relations suggests that fashionable styles of organizing collectives become 
fashionable styles of organizing to extract benefits for those collectives.  Unless 
alt-labor is a historical aberration, the other shoe, it would seem, is likely to drop. 
Or perhaps it has already hit the floor. In just the past few years, alt-labor’s 
core characteristics have seeped into settings where the workers are largely 
assembled and the real suspense surrounds the demand. Some of the innovations 
arising at this stage have started to receive attention under the heading 
“bargaining for the common good,” a reference to unions that coordinate 
“demands with those of their community allies.”98 It is an apt term. But from a 
broader vantage, these and other recent campaigns reveal more than a uniquely 
intimate labor-community alliance. They outline a new alignment with existing 
law, one that touches on the familiar categories of membership, jurisdiction, and 
doctrine. The era of “alt-bargaining,” it seems, has begun. 
Before surveying some key exemplars, it should be noted that to this point 
alt-bargaining appears largely confined to the public sector. This might be 
expected. As private sector unions scrambled to reverse declines throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, government unions, numerically stable and seemingly protected 
by state law, “made no substantive strategic adjustments” on the membership 
front.99 By 2010, shocking ruptures in state political economies put an 
unprecedented bulls-eye on public sector benefits, forcing unions to reassess 
bargaining as profoundly as private sector unions had long reassessed 
 
 95.  See Why We Strike, supra note 92 (“It’s time to pay people enough to survive. It’s time to pay 
people what they deserve. It’s time for $15/hr and union rights.”); see also GORDON, supra note 84, at 
165 (describing how rights-talk provided “a new sense of standing to challenge the suffering [workers] 
had previously felt intensely as individuals”). 
 96.  William Finnegan, Dignity, NEW YORKER (Sep. 15, 2014). 
 97.  Recent takes on the state-of-play include that “the twentieth century model of American labor 
relations is gone,” DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING 
AMERICA 21 (2016), and that traditional labor “is grounded and will not fly again.” JONATHAN 
ROSENBLUM, BEYOND FIFTEEN: IMMIGRANT WORKERS, FAITH ACTIVISTS, AND THE REVIVAL OF 
THE LABOR MOVEMENT 176 (2017). 
 98.  Joseph McCartin, Bargaining for the Common Good, DISSENT (Spring 2016); see also 
Bargaining for the Common Good, http://www.bargainingforthecommongood.org 
[https://perma.cc/FBE7-CQ69].  
 99.  Richard Hurd & Tamara Lee, Public Sector Unions Under Siege, 39 LAB. STUDIES. J. 9, 12 
(2014).  
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unionization as their own first priority.100 Yet, as discussed later, in this context 
the line between “public” and “private” is somewhat illusory, and bargaining for 
non-state benefits will almost assuredly take on “alt”-characteristics. 
Below, the case for alt-bargaining is depicted in three stylized accounts of 
recent bargaining campaigns that seem to draw on legal orientations now 
coursing through alt-labor. In Chicago, unionized teachers have revolutionized 
notions of membership by refusing to allow strict limits on the propriety of 
demands define the negotiating team. In five southern states, unionized 
educators have scattered into ad hoc offshoots, blown past bargaining bans, and 
won unprecedented benefits. And in Colorado and Minnesota, anti-union forces 
that pressed to pass laws meant to weaken workers’ hands learned that “be 
careful what you wish for” isn’t just an adage. 
A. Law and Membership: The Chicago Teachers Union 
Like union organizing, contract organizing is shaped by law. Under NLRA 
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3), employers and employee representatives must 
bargain, and under Section 8(d) they must do so “in good faith,”101 but only, as 
the Supreme Court has said, over the “mandatory” topics of “wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.”102 Other, “nonmandatory” subjects 
can be considered voluntarily, but neither party can “insist” on discussion as a 
precondition to agreement or to the point of a strike, lockout, or legal charge.103 
These so-called “permissive” topics expand over time through decisional law, but 
the biggest categories encompass product, sales, and financing decisions on one 
hand, and “core” operational or “entrepreneurial” choices on the other.104 
Criticisms of this regime are legion and pop-up when a surprised public learns 
that the permissive category includes the choice to kill the company—or a 
conspicuous part of it—as soon as a union shows up.105 The earliest critiques, 
though, warned that walling issues off from workers’ input promoted industrial 
insularity, endangering collective bargaining’s historic role in the joint tailoring 
of standards, norms, and practices to the needs of particular communities.106 By 
 
 100.  Joseph E. Slater, Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L. J. 189, 192–93 (2012).  
 101.  29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (8)(d). 
 102.  NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).  
 103.  Id.; Michael Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: The 
Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1447–1449 (1982).  
 104.  Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 220, 223 (1964). 
 105.  Billionaire Joe Ricketts’ decision to shutter news-sites DNAinfo and Gothamist days after 
unionizing was publicly condemned but legal under Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 
263, 269–72 (1965). Andy Newman, DNAinfo and Gothamist are Shut Down After Vote to Unionize, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017). So, too, Walmart’s near-instantaneous shift to pre-packaged meats once butchers 
voted for representation in 2000. Ann Zimmerman, Pro-Union Butchers at Walmart Win a Battle—but 
Lose the War, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2000). See also United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 540  v. 
NLRB, 519 F.3d 490, 495–96 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (requiring Walmart to bargain only over the “effects” of 
the shut-down, citing First Nat’l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. at 681–82).  
 106.  Archibald Cox & John Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor 
Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 405–06 (1950); Archibald Cox, 1957 Supreme Court Labor 
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the 1980s the prediction proved prophetic, as executives shuttered factory after 
factory, reducing neighborhoods to shells and neighbors to legal bystanders.107 
Alt-bargaining is ending the insularity. By vastly expanding the universe of 
parties with concrete interests at the negotiating table, the campaigns force 
employers to take community into account. While doing so has required a legal 
deftness well known to veteran negotiators, here the maneuvers are in service to 
a truly alternative conception of participation in contract bargaining. The 
Chicago Teachers Union’s (CTU) 2012 negotiation with the Chicago Public 
Schools (CPS) tells this story well. 
1. CORE 
The CTU represents around 25,000 teachers108 in the nation’s third-largest 
school district.109 Much of its history is activist, first with anti-Communist union 
purges in the 1940s and 1950s and then through strikes for African-American 
inclusion in full-time teaching during the 1960s.110 
The union’s most recent narrative, however, arises from complacency in the 
face of a school revitalization plan announced to great fanfare in the mid-2000s, 
“Renaissance 2010.”111 The name was ironic. To the extent Renaissance 2010 
“revived” anything in Chicago, it was the non-union sector by shutting down 100 
public schools and reopening them as private charters.112 But years of 
acquiescence to creeping mayoral control and rights restrictions in exchange for 
steady, and relatively hefty, raises113 had seemingly left the union flat-footed. 
Though an existential threat to a third of the membership, leadership’s response 
to the proposal was, as the Chicago Tribune described, a “curiously muted” no 
comment.114 Following the first 36 shutdowns and amid a base frustrated by 
stuffed classrooms, increasingly testing-centric curriculums, and perceived 
scapegoating,115 CTU actually dissolved its school closing committee in 2007.116 
 
Decisions, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1083 (1958). See also P.R. Louiseaux & Arthur S. Miller, Collective 
Bargaining: Some Fundamental Assumptions in Law and Practice, 35 TEX. L. REV. 188, 188–89 (1956) 
(likening collective bargaining agreements to private governments that “legislate for the network of 
factory communities and the millions of members of those communities”).   
 107.  See, e.g., Local 1330 v. U.S. Steel, 631 F.2d 1264, 1279–82 (6th Cir. 1980) (describing, “with great 
sympathy,” corporations’ only theoretical relationship to the “public interest” absent profitability).  
 108.  Chicago Teachers Union, About Us, https://www.ctunet.com/about [https://perma.cc/8DLP-
83SH] (2019). 
 109.  Matt Masterson, CPS Enrollment Drops to 360,000 Students, WTTW News (Oct. 26, 2018). 
 110.  JANE MCALEVEY, NO SHORTCUTS: ORGANIZING FOR POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 103 
(2016).  
 111.  Tom Alter, “It Felt Like Community”: Social Movement Unionism and the Chicago Teachers 
Union Strike of 2012, 10 LABOR 11, 14–15 (2013). 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  STEVEN ASHBY & ROBERT BRUNO, A FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE 
STORY OF THE CHICAGO TEACHERS STRIKE 31 (2016). 
 114.  Tracy Dell’Angela, Daley set to remake troubled schools, CHI. TRIB. (June 25, 2004).  
 115.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 46–47. 
 116.  MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 110, 112. 
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Internal resistance grew subtly and slowly. The committee gone, a handful of 
teachers spent the year recording colleagues, parents, and students talking about 
the impact of school closings and meeting as a reading circle.117 Naomi Klein’s 
Shock Doctrine had a powerful impact, convincing the group that the closures 
had little to do about the exigencies of austerity or test scores and much to do 
with the corporate exigency to do away with public goods under the guise of 
crisis-management.118 
Next came a bit of growth, a name—the Caucus of Rank-and-File Educators 
(CORE)—and a coming-out in the form of questions at school board hearings, 
social events, and meetings with pre-existing groups with names to match their 
neighborhoods.119 Throughout, the headline was school closings, but the lede was 
member and public education. The study groups multiplied and were joined at a 
two-day retreat in mid-2008.120 “I was fascinated by the idea that I needed to study 
this, [that] I needed to understand . . . why is it that we’re doing this,” said an 
early supporter.121 When 500 teachers, parents, and local activists packed a 
college auditorium for a teach-in during a January 2009 blizzard,122 CORE had 
the city’s attention. The closure list shrank the following month.123 
The caucus also had CTU’s attention. That October, CORE ran test 
candidates for two seats on the union’s pension board and won both.124 In January 
2011, CORE nominated Karen Lewis, a 23-year veteran chemistry teacher and 
only African-American woman in her Dartmouth graduating class, for CTU’s 
presidency.125 Though by May’s election day the caucus had only 400 official 
members, many more informal supporters fanned-out across 600 schools to 
secure enough votes to force a run-off with the incumbents.126 CORE’s true reach 
was revealed in a “Save Our Schools” rally in downtown Chicago that featured 
the biggest teacher turnout in over twenty years.127 Easily consolidating votes 
from the departed candidates, Lewis won the presidency in a walk.128 Her victory 
speech read like the last class in the CORE curriculum: “Corporate America sees 
K-12 public education as 380 billion dollars that, up until the last ten or fifteen 
years, they didn’t have a sizable piece of. This so-called school reform is not an 
 
 117.  Id. at 110–11.  
 118.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 62. 
 119.  Id. at 62–65. 
 120.  Id. at 64. 
 121.  Id. at 65. 
 122.  Id. at 66. 
 123.  MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 113. 
 124.  Id. at 114. 
 125.  Ben Goldberger, Karen Lewis, Street Fighter, CHICAGO MAG (Oct. 2, 2012).  
 126.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 68. 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. 
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education plan. It’s a business plan.”129 If so, the final exam was clear but 
amazingly ambitious: Getting “business . . . out of our schools.”130 
2. Rules, Interests, and Seats 
Unlike many reform caucuses, CORE’s rise had been premised not on wages, 
give-backs, or corruption but a challenge to an emerging national consensus that 
public learning needed private investment and expertise to succeed.131 The vision 
flourished in Chicago, where Renaissance 2010’s mass privatization plans 
seamlessly transitioned to Mayor Rahm Emanuel in 2011, who appointed a 
charter booster as CPS CEO and stacked the school board with finance stars, 
including the director of Bank One as president.132 
With contract negotiations just months away,133 the central question was 
whether CORE’s long-term, even aspirational, organizing principle could 
translate into a credible negotiating posture for the refurbished union.134 That 
Emanuel had staked much of his campaign on openly anti-CTU sentiment135—
instantly instantiated by the new school board’s inaugural vote rescinding a 
previously agreed-to raise136—made the issue acute. That it had been decades 
since teachers had seriously battled for a contract made it urgent.137 
The legal answer was “no.” The state’s Chicago-specific teacher bargaining 
statute made permissive subjects explicit, and layoffs, force reductions, places of 
instruction were on the list.138 If the city was willing to discuss one of these so-
called “Section 4.5 subjects,” it was free to start implementing its position in the 
interim.139 If negotiations got stuck, the sole recourse was toothless mediation “in 
lieu of a strike.”140 The regime did not take walkouts completely off the table, but 
the rallying cry would have to be wages, healthcare, or some other “direct[]” 
teacher benefit, not banks.141 
 
 129.  MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 119. 
 130.  MICAH UETRICHT, STRIKE FOR AMERICA: CHICAGO TEACHERS AGAINST AUSTERITY 37 
(2014).  
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REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2012) (describing a “golden moment” for private equity and special education as a 
“growth market”).   
 132.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 71. 
 133.  Id. at 151.  
 134.  See Amisha Patel, The Long Road to Victory, JACOBIN (Oct. 13, 2016) (calling this the “key 
question” of  the CTU negotiations).  
 135.  MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 126. 
 136.  Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago Public Schools board rescinds teacher raises, CHI. TRIB. (Jun. 
15, 2011).  
 137.  MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 129. 
 138.  115 ILCS 5/4.5(a). The city also had unilateral power “over matters of inherent managerial 
policy,” including the “overall budget.” 115 ILCS 5/4.  
 139.  Id. at 5/4.5(b).  
 140.  Id.; Bd. of Educ. v. IELRB, 2011 WL 10088350, 2011 IL App. (1st) 111696, para. 8 (IL.App. 
2011) (providing for “mediation of [Section 4.5] disputes by a rotating mediation panel” that “may 
include the issuance of. . .recommendations”).  
 141.  115 ILCS 5/4. See also 115 ILCS 13 (permitting strikes after a series of procedural prerequisites). 
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Yet the statute also assumed bilateral talks and, from CORE’s perspective, 
privatization was not a bilateral issue. Closings were a kids’ issue. A University 
of Chicago analysis found that they provoked deep student grief akin to “a period 
of mourning.”142 Social marginalization at the new school followed, as did “a long-
term negative impact on” math skills and shorter-term declines in reading.143 
Students with disabilities were especially worse off.144 Closings also affected 
parents, who knew that jumbling students also meant jumbling gangs, which 
meant fresh tensions and violence.145 The city hired monitors to keep watch as 
students navigated new routes through new neighborhoods to new schools.146 
There was an undeniable racial component to the city’s plans as well, with ninety 
percent of the slated closings impacting majority black student populations.147 
Finally, taxpayers had an interest, since all the promised cost-savings never 
seemed to pan out.148 
The new leadership’s insight was that acceding to the statute meant ceding all 
of these interests, reserving, in effect, a single seat on the union side of the table. 
So they didn’t accede and secured a bigger reservation—and a different menu—
in the process. 
3. City Checkers, Union Chess 
As the contract campaign began, it did not take long to see that CPS and CTU 
had different conceptions of the ground rules. As city leaders pushed narratives 
of children on the hook for union raises, Lewis spoke of a “fight for the soul of 
public education.”149 Calls for “reform” were met by cartoon “fat cats” stripping 
classrooms bare.150 
It wasn’t rhetoric or a play for viral videos. The union made steep salary cuts 
to hire six organizers to oversee a new school-based delegate program to 
internally push the theme: the next contract was about “billionaires, banks, and 
racism,” not paychecks.151 The outward-facing side of the campaign was led by 
 
The “effects” of Section 4.5 subjects are hybrid matters: mandatory bargaining topics but not subject to 
strikes. 115 ILCS 5/4.5(a).  
 142.  Molly F. Gordon et. al., School Closings in Chicago, UCHICAGO CONSORTIUM ON SCHOOL 
RESEARCH 4 (May 2018).  
 143.  Id. at 5. 
 144.  Adeshina Emmanuel, What happened to Sylvia Galvines? CHALKBEAT (Jun. 11, 2018), 
https://chalkbeat.org/posts/chicago/2018/06/11/school-closings-special-education/ 
[https://perma.cc/4Q3Z-7CT2]. 
 145.  SARAH JAFFE, NECESSARY TROUBLE: AMERICANS IN REVOLT 119 (2016).  
 146.  Gordon, supra note 142, at 4.  
 147.  Carol Caref et al., Twelve Months Later, CTU RESEARCH DEPT. 3 (2013), 
https://www.ctunet.com/quest-center/TwelveMonthsLaterReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR3D-ST7W]. 
 148.  Stephanie Famer, et al., Research Brief on School Closures, CReATE 2 (March 2013). 
 149.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 125, 234. 
 150.  UETRICHT, supra note 130, at 98–99. 
 151.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 108, 110; MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 122. The 
conversations paid immediate dividends when the union scrambled to mobilize against a surprise (and 
ultimately illegal) offer by the Mayor to pay bonuses if teachers preemptively agreed to a longer school 
day, a permissive subject he could have eventually implemented on his own. ASHBY & BRUNO, supra 
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“The Schools Chicago’s Students Deserve,” a fourty-six-page potpourri of 
demands the union had no legal right to demand.152 Art, world languages, free 
transit, and healthy food made compelling on-ramps for discussing the upcoming 
contract talks with parents during teacher conferences,153 on calls and 
canvasses,154 and in leaflets distributed with report cards.155 Closures were 
depicted as a financial maneuver funneling millions to private entities and a key 
driver of a “two-tier education . . . apartheid” in Chicago.156 They were also called 
“racist.”157 
The goal was to personalize the bargaining process by seeding the closing and 
financialization issues as the community’s own. Early signs suggested it was 
working. The report’s spotlight on the use of Tax-Increment-Financing (TIF), a 
supposed anti-blight lever, to renovate Chicago Mercantile Exchange bathrooms 
and a Cadillac showroom instead of schools became cause for trespass and 
arrests, not just talking points.158 Anti-closure protests were repeated, aggressive, 
and increasingly borrowed tactics popularized by the ascendant anti-bank 
movement Occupy Wall Street. In late-2011, 300 parents and teachers welcomed 
the start of negotiations by shutting down a school board meeting after 
monopolizing the floor through “mic-checks” or comments repeated en-masse.159 
The next month, 200 teachers, parents, and activists had a three-night sleep-over 
in City Hall.160 In February, Occupy Chicago joined to turn the soon-to-be 
privatized Piccolo Elementary into a campground.161 Overflowing, disruptive 
school board meetings became the norm.162 
By May 2012, the border between union and community activism had 
seemingly dissolved. When 500 African-American and Latino parents staged a 
weeknight vigil in front of Mayor Emanuel’s house, CTU joined but later 
admitted community sentiment had forced its hand, having long avoided protests 
in front of the Mayor’s children.163 The union’s plans for a climatic, hundred-bus 
contract rally called not only for the city’s largest auditorium, but overflow into 
Occupy Chicago’s old home-base and a simultaneous corporate tax protest 
 
note 113, at 111. Wide-spread participation in red-shirt Fridays and the results of internal straw polls 
showed that the message was sinking in. Id.  
 152.  CTU, The Schools Chicago’s Students Deserve (Feb. 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter, 
Schools]. 
 153.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 125. 
 154.  MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 120. 
 155.  Id. at 114.  
 156.  Schools, supra note 152, at 27–28, 13. 
 157.  Id. at 13.  
 158.  Schools, supra note 152, at 33; Abdon Pallasch, TIF marchers demand $4M from N. Side auto 
dealers, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 20, 2011) (protesting funds “diverted from public schools and given to 
developers”).   
 159.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 126, 151. 
 160.  Id. at 126. 
 161.  John Byrne, Overnight school sit-in ends, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2012).  
 162.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 127. 
 163.  Steven Ashby, Ashby Response to Rosenblum and Juravich, 42 LAB. STUD. J. 398, 403 (2017). 
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around the corner, courtesy of Stand Up! Chicago, a labor-neighborhood 
coalition.164 
Newspapers painted the auditorium’s atmosphere variously as “thunderous,” 
“revival-style,”165 and “angry,” but the key takeaway was the crowd’s reaction to 
Lewis’s seemingly rhetorical question: “So why are we here?”166 The response—
“Strike! Strike! Strike!”—was both prescient and precarious.167 
4. Strikes, Strictures, and Support 
On paper, a walkout seemed unlikely. It hadn’t happened in twenty-five 
years, and the state had recently passed Senate Bill 7 (SB 7), legislation requiring 
strike authorization from an unprecedented 75% of the union’s total membership 
(not just among those voting).168 The point, as education reformer Jonah 
Edelman explained in audio leaked from the Aspen Institute’s gathering of 
corporate elite, was that the union “wouldn’t have the right to strike even though 
the right was maintained.”169 That SB 7’s pre-strike factfinder dangled a 
whopping 35.74% raise added to a sense that getting that type of unity would be 
difficult.170 
It was not difficult. Ninety-two percent of the union came out for the 
authorization vote, 98% voted “yes,” and CTU told the factfinder, “no deal.”171 
The reality was that over time the specter of a strike had transformed into a union 
obligation, essentially foregone.172 A teacher contract had become the epicenter 
of a social fight joined by parents, students, and various groups combatting 
poverty, violence, and racism.173 To settle now would be to deny that community 
agency and ownership over at least a piece—the corporate piece—of the 
corrective.174 As Steven Ashby and Robert Bruno put it, “[l]ots of people were 
involved in the dispute, and now they needed a place to act.” 175 A conference 
room wouldn’t cut it.176 
Yet, there was also the legal context. The demands that convened the 
community—things that in most negotiations might serve as narrative devices—
had been sent across the bargaining table. Proposals related to air conditioning, 
music, playgrounds, libraries, and the holy grail, closings, were fine to offer but 
 
 164.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 117-18. 
 165.  Editorial, City teachers: ‘We need a voice,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 25, 2012).  
 166.  Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Teachers Ready for Battle, CHI. TRIB. (May 24, 2012). 
 167.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 118. 
 168.  Alter, supra note 111, at 21-22. 
 169.  UETRICHT, supra note 130, at 10, 60-62; MCALEVEY, supra note 110, at 101. 
 170.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 164–66; Alter, supra note 111, at 22.  
 171.  “No” votes amounted to a minute 482. Alter, supra note 111, at 22. 
 172.  This, in fact, was the conclusion reached by the city’s chief negotiator. ASHBY & BRUNO, supra 
note 113, at 183. 
 173.  See id. (describing the bargaining process as “a social compact”). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See id. 
 176.  Id. 
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illegal if pushed too seriously or, as now seemed inevitable, inspired a strike.177 
Injunctions and crippling fines meant the union needed to press its case with care. 
But since bargaining is a messy process, it could also do so shrewdly. Negotiators 
were tacitly relieved, for example, by the city’s self-evidently low wage offer, 
since prolonged hand-wringing on a low-priority mandatory topic opened the 
door for copious counters packed with permissive subjects.178 At times, the union 
seemed to use Section 4.5’s strictures to its advantage, amplifying its permissible 
pitch for more staffing in slyly noting to the Sun-Times that, “[c]ertainly CPS is 
not obligated to bargain the fact that out of the 10 largest cities, we have the third-
highest student-to-nurse and student-to-counselor ratio.”179 And while the city 
refused to discuss nearly every non-mandatory issue,180 CTU exposed the 
factfinder as a promiscuous listener, freeing its heavily rank-and-file bargaining 
team to bring harsh teaching realities to life through story after story.181 When 
the factfinder’s final recommendations stretched beyond his narrow statutory 
mandate and endorsed the union’s perspective on the Mayor’s highly-touted plan 
to lengthen the school day, frustrated city officials were forced to parry 
alternatives CTU had no legal right to debate.182 
In a deeper respect, CTU just plowed through the law.183 Shutdowns were the 
sticking point.  The city’s refusal to reckon with its omnipotence or budge on the 
secondary issue of transfer rights for laid-off teachers provoked the stoppage in 
the literal sense that, once CPS’s position was fully exposed, CTU’s negotiator 
announced: “I think we’re on strike.”184 Much of the union’s public rhetoric was 
equally brazen. Statements surrounding its statutorily-required ten-day strike 
notice led with wages but emphasized the city’s “draconian policies” as the 
“larger picture,” grouping the “Board’s plan to close over 100 schools” alongside 
“shut down[s]” of “public housing, public health clinics, [and] public libraries.”185 
Permissive issues dotted every flyer and strike bulletin, shielded only by a 
discordant disclaimer reminding the public that none of it mattered enough to 
strike over.186 
 
 177.  Id. at 146–47, 167, 202.   
 178.  Id. at 153.  
 179.  Letter to Editor, Karen Lewis, CPS refusing to bargain, not CTU, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jun.14, 
2012).  
 180.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 202. 
 181.  Id. at 169–70. 
 182.  Id. at 170–71,164–65. 
 183.  In a “backhanded affirmation” of the union’s approach, the city’s chief negotiator said that CTU 
“ran roughshod over the law.” Id. at 228.  
 184.  Id. at 182 (calling this “the Gordian knot of the . . . struggle”). In an effort to defuse pressure on 
the Mayor’s priority of a longer school day, the city did initially agree to discuss recall rights, but an 
interim agreement received backlash from principals and was scuttled by Emanuel. Id. at 172–73.  
 185.  CTU Press Release, CTU files notice of intent to strike (Aug. 29, 2012), 
https://www.ctunet.com/media/press-releases/breaking-news-ctu-files-notice-of-intent-to-strike 
[https://perma.cc/BGQ5-CJME].  
 186.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 234. 
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The union had placed a bet on issue magnetism, that massive support for the 
demands framing CTU’s rise would, in the strike’s opening salvos, ruin the city’s 
appetite for legal theories. The wager paid. City leaders would later admit they 
were “stunned” by union’s control of the narrative.187 Over nine days, 95% of the 
membership picketed schools by breakfast (with pancakes cooked by parents), 
roved neighborhoods by lunch (in step with student marching bands), and 
coalesced downtown by dinner (conjuring a sea of CTU-red).188 Fifty-thousand 
people showed up the first afternoon.189  Throughout, allies lacking obvious 
connections to the labor movement, who the Sun-Times labeled “shadow 
strikers,” seeped into the throngs.190 “Community organizations are so supportive 
because teachers have the same vision we have,” explained a leader.191 The vision 
included a march on Hyatt to protest a $5.2 million TIF gift as seven surrounding 
schools juggled $3.4 million in budget cuts.192 
Throughout, the teacher and union drumbeat was pro-kids and pro-public 
jobs. After the CPS CEO warned that strikes harm students, a post by a teacher 
blogging under the moniker “Teacher-X” got 20,000 hits in twenty-four hours 
with lines like, “When you close and turnaround schools disrupting thousands  
. . . often plunging them into violence [with] no data to support your practice, that 
hurts our kids.”193 CTU’s Vice-President took to ABC News to report agreement 
on wages with the glaring caveat that only “the big education issues” would get 
“to a settlement on this deal.”194 
The lawyers could question the messaging, but CPS leadership had to live 
with the results. A clear majority of Chicagoans following the strike both 
supported it and blamed the Mayor. Sixty-six percent of public school parents 
sided with the union.195 CTU had come to be viewed as one of the strongest 
advocates for racial justice in the city.196 
5. Agreement 
CPS did, in fact, eventually file for a TRO, but only after a deal had been 
reached and the Mayor reacted in fury to the union’s vote to continue striking 
 
 187.  Id. at 234. 
 188.  Id. at 194, 192, 195. 
 189.  Alter, supra note 113, at 23.  
 190.  Laura Washington, ‘Shadow Strikers,’ CHI. SUN-TIMES (Sep. 17, 2012).  
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id.; ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 206. 
 193.  Xian Barrett, Blog, Why I’m Striking, JCB, Teacher-X (Sep. 9, 2012), 
http://chiteacherx.blogspot.com/2012/09/why-im-striking-jcb.html [https://perma.cc/PZ3P-V66H]; Xian 
Barrett, My view: From the picket lines, CNN.COM (Sep. 13, 2012), 
http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/13/my-view-from-the-picket-lines/ 
[https://perma.cc/PFP9-3T7C]. 
 194.  Bd. Educ. v. CTU, Complaint and Request for TRO, para. 28 (Sep. 17, 2012), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-full-text-of-request-for-injunction-to-end-
teachers-strike-20120917-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/UAZ9-8GLW] 
 195.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 205. 
 196.  Id. at 237. 
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while members reviewed the proposal (plus an added day for Rosh Hashanah).197 
Scrutiny was needed, said one organizer, for fear that “we would disappoint the 
community by not winning things like air-conditioning.”198 Ultimately, the court 
sealed Section 4.5’s irrelevance by scheduling a hearing for the day after the 
contract was approved.199 The move, according to the Tribune, could be 
attributed to the judge’s reluctance “to offend” the roiling labor community.200 
The finalized agreement did not stop school “reform.”201 Though teachers 
would for the first time have rights to “follow students”202 displaced by closings—
which had the secondary effect of making shutdowns less attractive to 
privatizers—Lewis soon faced an internal challenger of her own for failing to 
secure “a guarantee not to close schools.”203 
It did, however, cement a new take on bargaining that, unmoored from legal 
protocol, links “membership” to demands and counts on that community to show 
up and fight. Reflecting on the change, CTU’s lawyer remarked that he’d never 
before “participated in a work stoppage that the public supported.”204 
B. Law and Jurisdiction: Teachers in Revolt 
Unlike the federalized private sector, labor rights for public workers vary by 
state. CTU can strike legally because Illinois law allows it, while its New York 
affiliate, under the so-called “Taylor Law,” may not.205 Some states go straight to 
the source and ban collective bargaining itself, while others prohibit it for certain 
employees, leave it up to cities and towns, or limit it to something more informal, 
like open-ended discussion.206 Unsurprisingly, limiting bargaining rights limits 
unions. States without comprehensive regimes typically have far fewer public 
sector union members207 and, partly in turn, pay less.208 Much-discussed 
forthcoming research also finds that law-based bargaining gaps dampen union 
political activism substantially and even “demobilize[e]” the membership.209 
 
 197.  Id. at 220–21. 
 198.  Id. at 224. 
 199.  Jason Meisner, Court hearing set for Wednesday, after union vote, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2012).  
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Indeed, “mass closings” continued throughout 2013. Lauren FitzPatrick, CPS to list 40 vacant 
schools, mostly from 2013 mass closings, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017).  
 202.  New Agreement, Highlights, 75 CHI. UNION TEACHER 1, 17 (Sept./Oct. 2012), [hereinafter New 
Agreement], https://www.ctunet.com/media/downloadable-pdf/CUT_Vol_75_Iss_1_FINAL.pdf (on file 
with the author). 
 203.  Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, CTU Members to Run Against Lewis’ Leadership Team, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 
24, 2013). Teachers also won on a variety of other non-mandatory issues, including hundreds of new hires 
in art and music. New Agreement, supra note 202, at 17.   
 204.  ASHBY & BRUNO, supra note 113, at 225. 
 205.  NYS Civ. Serv. L. § 201(1) (1967).  
 206.  For an overview of this complexity, see Joseph E. Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-
Sector Labor Law, 30 HOFSTRA J. EMP. & LAB. L. 511, 512–13 (2013).  
 207.  Rosenfeld, supra note 30, at 35–36. 
 208.  Id. at 49; Jeffrey Keefe, Eliminating Fair Share Fees Would Increase the Pay Penalty, ECON. 
POLICY INST. 4 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/93216.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJG5-SA59]. 
 209.  James Feigenbaum et al., From the Bargaining Table to the Ballot Box, Unpublished Manuscript 
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 The 2018 history is different. Five times in five states, “no bargaining right” 
was no reason not to bargain. In West Virginia, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Arizona, 
and North Carolina ad hoc groups of union and non-union teachers struck for 
between one and nine school days, forcing impromptu benefit negotiations at 
makeshift tables stuffed into legal gaps.210 None had the right to strike,211 none 
had an affirmative right to bargain.212 While a different story can be told for each 
state, the big picture reveals four shared elements. 
1. Social Media Infrastructure 
Emerging from the absence of law-based bargaining blueprints is a new, social 
media-driven infrastructure for navigating negotiations. Facebook, in particular, 
has played an out-sized role in funneling teachers’ interests into discrete forums 
amid sprawling, disconnected workplaces. In West Virginia, what could have 
been a throw-away thought on a Facebook group for educators’ concerns—“any 
talks of striking?”—provoked “an explosion” of replies, the first derisive, the rest 
a counter-avalanche of acclamation: There will not be an end to the cuts until a 
line is drawn; As long as you take it . . . they will keep giving it to you; Teachers 
went on strike in 1990.213 The group grew to over 20,000 members before dividing 
into school districts as talk turned to the question: How do we organize this?214 
Disappointed to find that his union had not set up something similar, social-
studies teacher Alberto Morejon created the “Oklahoma Walkout—The Time is 
Now!” group late one night and awoke to find it populated with 20,000 
 
5, n.14, 12, 18, 20, 23 (Jan. 20, 2018), https://jamesfeigenbaum.github.io/research/pdf/fhw_rtw_ 
jan2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED4W-66CS]. 
 210.  Pedagogic protests: Behind the teacher strikes that have roiled five states, ECONOMIST (May 5, 
2018). While Colorado is often included in this list, there teachers have long collectively bargained with 
local districts and leaders themselves described the protest—approved by schools in advance—as “a rally, 
not a strike.” Danika Worthington, What you need to know about why Colorado teachers are walking out 
of classes and onto the Capitol, DEN. POST (Apr. 24, 2018); Independence Institute, Colorado School 
District CBAs, https://i2i.org/k-12-issues/labor-and-employment/unions-and-bargaining/colorado-
school-district-collective-bargaining-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/9ZYT-HRYM]. In North Carolina, 
where collective bargaining is outlawed, teachers technically engaged in a “slowdown” or “sickout” by 
coordinating personal days state-wide to “overwhelm the system with absences” and force shutdowns. T. 
Keung Hui, Thousands of NC teachers will march, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER (May 16, 2018). 
 211.  Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining, CEPR 8 (Mar. 
2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/62PD-G964]. 
 212.  See infra notes 219–21. In Kentucky and Arizona, bargaining is allowed but, with no statutory 
structure to do so, never required. Sanes & Schmitt, supra note 211, at 15, 24. 
 213.  Rick Hampson, ‘Any talks of striking?’: How a West Virginia teacher’s Facebook post started a 
national movement, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2019). 
 214.  Id.; Kate Doyle Griffiths, Crossroads and Country Roads, VIEWPOINT MAG. (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/03/13/crossroads-and-country-roads-wildcat-west-virginia-and-the-
possibilities-of-a-working-class-offensive/ [https://perma.cc/BX85-Z38C]. 
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members.215 By weeks-end, 72,000 had signed up.216 Kentucky’s strike vehicle, 
KY120 United, was and is a Facebook group.217 
Tasks benefitting from synchronicity, like time-sensitive decision-making, 
responding to legislative testimony, or coordinating picket lines, often used the 
video-streaming service “FacebookLive.”218 In West Virginia, teachers joined a 
feed to vote on whether to return to work, with the results and discussion 
forwarded to the superintendent.219 The Arizona walkout officially ended with a 
Facebook video.220 Twitter served a similar function, facilitating en-masse 
critique of legislative counter-proposals in nearly real-time.221 The setting was 
serious enough that retweeting the “wrong” stance post-consensus could be 
viewed as “tantamount to crossing a picket line.”222 
And, of course, social media has played its now customary movement role in 
building and expressing solidarity. The #RedForEd hashtag, for example, was 
coined in Arizona223 but quickly became the short-hand for supporting education 
protests in general.224 North Carolina teachers, the last to walk, drew particular 
inspiration from the early online activism in ways commentators likened to the 
surging #MeToo anti-harassment movement.225 And while thousands of in-
person actions brought indispensable local momentum to every campaign, on-
line amplification took the energy national. Arizona teachers’ “how-to” guides 
to small-scale protests like “walk-ins”—short, in-school demonstrations “30 
minutes before the first bell”—invariably ended with all-caps reminders to 
“report the results” to Facebook and Twitter.226 Prompt celebrity validation, like 
supportive tweets from Reese Witherspoon, Bette Midler, and James Marsden 
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https://www.cbsnews.com/news/arizona-teachers-walkout-ends-red-for-ed-today-2018-05-03/ 
[https://perma.cc/N5VX-3J8L]. 
 221.  Griffiths, supra note, at 214. 
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http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2018/05/what_exactly_is_redfored.html 
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to their millions of followers227 suggested that all the social media messaging was 
indeed getting out. 
It also helped shake, and scatter, the nature of labor advocacy. 
2. Institutional Decentering 
 As noted, the standard consequence of harsh state labor regimes is not the 
absence of unions, but their smallness or weakness. In North Carolina, where 
labor contracts are expressly forbidden, the “union” is essentially a voluntary 
association that, like any other interest group, is limited to lobbying politicians 
for beneficial treatment of its members.228 Oklahoma repealed the right to 
bargain in 2011, and while the Oklahoma Education Association remains, teacher 
pay is forty-ninth in the nation.229 West Virginia unions can bargain if they can 
persuade local officials to sit down voluntarily, but no one volunteers.230 
 Amid this vulnerability, the quick and unexpected activist upswells have had 
the effect of decentering these institutional avenues for public worker advocacy. 
That union listservs and elected officials took a backseat to social media 
applications in facilitating strikes and mediating demands is some proof of this. 
Deeper evidence comes from examining how the destabilization progressed 
in different states. Probably the best-case scenario played out in Arizona, where 
the Facebook group Arizona Educators United (AEU) ballooned to 40,000-
strong days after twenty-three-year-old teacher Noah Karvelis created it.231 Joe 
Thomas, the incumbent Arizona Education Association’s president, heartily 
embraced the faction, calling it a “breath of fresh air” and appearing at AEU 
rallies and on its FacebookLive feed.232 Both signed a letter requesting to meet 
with the Governor, listing only AEU’s five demands.233 
But even a less complete meld of institution and upstart can generate new 
activism access points and, in turn, new activists. Politically unaffiliated and 
without the cultural baggage unionism can carry in red-states, West Virginia’s 
Facebook group was home to Hillary voters, Trump acolytes, union members and 
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154 (2012); Rankings and Estimates, NEA Research, C-5 (May 2017), 
http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/2017RankingsandEstimatesReport-FINAL-SECURED.pdf (on file with 
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27, 2018), https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2018/04/27/unions-strike-wave-recedes/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4WF-C3RJ]. 
 231.  Daniels, supra note 217. 
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 233.  Letter from AEA and AEU to Governor Ducey, Apr. 17, 2018, 
https://actionnetwork.org/user_files/user_files/000/022/623/original/2nd_Gov_demand_letter.pdf 
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objectors alike.234 While moderators did their best to keep the focus on local, 
unifying issues, the group’s non-institutional pedigree made the biggest 
solidarity-enhancing contribution by cultivating homemade—and frequently off-
color—memes and song lyrics promoting demands.235 Photos mocking 
intransigent Senate President Carmichael’s “resting Mitch face” was a viral 
favorite.236 The rag-tag vibe translated to a kind of authenticity at rallies, where 
boilerplate union shirts and signs were traded for bespoke tees and placards with 
witticisms like, “[i]n a world full of Carmichaels be an Ojeda,” referencing a 
favored politician that teachers joked was their Obi-Wan Kenobi.237 
In other ways, decentralization created coordination challenges. In late-
February, West Virginia Education Association leaders strode to the capitol 
steps and announced to a crowd of Facebook-organized protesters that the union 
had reached a deal with the Governor for five percent raises and a healthcare 
task force.238 A voice rose up—“[w]e’re not going back in for that!”—followed by 
chants of “[w]e are the union bosses . . . [b]ack to the table!”239 A wildcat strike 
was on. 
The Oklahoma rank-and-file were less successful, the strike ending at the 
behest of the longstanding teachers’ association, a bit player at best in the lead-
up to the walkout.240 A journalist who shadowed the “Oklahoma-Teacher-
Walkout” Facebook group throughout the strike described members as 
“devastated.”241 
Grassroots leaders faced complications too. Arizona’s deep “ideological 
aversion to taxes” perched its walk-out on a high-wire: higher rates on one side, 
parent backlash on the other.242 Attentive to sustained conservative attacks and 
an intensifying #PurpleforParents counter-hashtag campaign, AEU called the 
strike after a week, “provok[ing] shock and anger” not from the union, but their 
own #RedforEd faithful.243 
3. Broad Demands 
Compounding these organizational challenges were dizzying lists of bottom-
up demands. While stagnant pay, rising insurance premiums, and pension 
changes underpinned the core appeals,244 the course of negotiations exposed the 
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bread-and-butter issues as kindling for much broader concerns. In many districts 
teachers had become, in figurative and sometimes literal senses, “social workers” 
ensconced in workplaces that reproduced the surrounding community’s deficits 
on a daily basis.245 The strikes showed that teachers not only internalized those 
deficits but would fight for fixes by translating them into claims touching on 
everything from textbooks to Wall Street. 
In some cases, the transition resulted in something very concrete. Arizona 
teachers had five brief bulleted demands, like returning “school funding to 2008 
levels” and no tax cuts until “per-pupil spending reaches [the] national 
average.”246 Oklahoma educators, on the other hand, just wanted to escape 
budgets so radically thin that parents confronted three-day weekends and ESL 
students were paired with instructors assigned to meet with 270 students a day.247 
The asks in North Carolina were somewhere in between and ranged from the 
specific (new teaching materials), to the general (Medicaid expansion), to the 
aspirational (“prioritize[d] classrooms . . . not corporate board rooms”).248 
None of it was lip service. West Virginia teachers secured a five percent bump 
but stayed on strike until it was extended to all classes of public employees.249 
Oklahoma teachers won a historic $6,000 raise before hundreds marched from 
Tulsa to Oklahoma City and thousands struck for over a week for more school 
funding.250 When the legislature rejected a string of new revenue bills, educators 
ran for office in numbers that overwhelmed the filing office.251 And while a 
twenty percent raise ended Arizona’s nine-day walkout, the state’s refusal to 
boost school revenue or pull back on privatization252 prompted teachers to keep 
pushing by putting pro-tax and anti-voucher measures on the fall ballot.253 
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4. Legislative Precarity 
There is no doubt the teachers “won.” Every state enhanced benefits, 
reversed cut-backs,254 or, in the case of North Carolina’s one-day electoral-
focused strike, pulled off “the largest act of organized teacher political action in 
state history.”255 Throughout the winter and spring, public opinion was firmly on 
their side.256 
Yet these were street negotiations. No one signed a contract. What states gave 
they could also take away, and some did. Days after passing a hotel tax to pay for 
raises and revenue, Oklahoma repealed it.257 The promise of twenty percent 
raises that ended the Arizona strike did not, once enacted, fully pan out for many 
teachers.258 West Virginia’s universal public worker raise was paid for, yet not, as 
expected, with a gas tax, but by especially regressive cuts to tuition subsidies and 
possibly Medicaid.259 Lawmakers have tried to make future raises contingent on 
charter schools.260 
The lesson, in the end, seemed to be that bargaining in legal gaps can work, 
but negotiation requires a two-fold power: the power to assemble a massive 
bargaining team, yes, but later, the power to bring everybody back. 
C. Law and Empowerment: Embracing Collective Bargaining 
In Janus v. AFSCME,261 the Supreme Court barred public sector unions from 
charging non-members fees for representing them in bargaining. This was, 
depending on the source, a “devastating,”262 “decisive,”263 or even 
“eviscerating”264 blow. Organized labor was more sanguine. Steeling for the 
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outcome had “made the union stronger,” said a Midwest spokesperson.265 “They 
woke us up,” described a leader on the west coast.266 “No one wanted this case,” 
explained a union president, “but the gestalt around the country has been to turn 
an existential threat into an opportunity.”267 
It would be fair to chalk these responses up to making the best of changed 
circumstances. But optimistic takes and canny reactions to challenging law are 
becoming a mini-trend when unions prepare to bargain. In fact, when Janus’s 
logic was previously applied just in the home-care industry, in some states new 
strategies helped unions actually increase membership and pile-up raises.268 
A more direct example comes from the rise of so-called “bargaining 
transparency” bills, which aim to make contract negotiations a communal affair 
by amending open meeting laws to include state and local discussions with public 
sector unions.269 Twelve states have already adopted the language, sometimes 
taken from template legislation270 shopped by conservative groups arguing that 
“a third-party’s money” in bargaining necessitates taxpayer “scrutiny during 
debate, not just after” agreement.271 “Secret” negotiations, the Goldwater 
Institute contends, grease “backroom deals elected officials too often 
rubberstamp.”272 
Traditionally, unions and their allies have branded the bills gimmicks less 
about good government than delay and grandstanding.273 The public, for its part, 
hardly ever shows up when it has the chance.274 
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Both dynamics, though, are changing. 
1. Colorado 
When Colorado’s Proposition 104 opened up teacher bargaining in 2015, the 
“goal,” according to the libertarian Independence Institute, was for “the public 
to watch.”275  The Colorado Education Association had opposed the change,276 
and when contract negotiations came up for its biggest affiliate in 2017, staying 
under-the-radar would have been a logical strategy. Instead, the Denver 
Classroom Teachers Association (DCTA) called supporters’ bluff—and raised 
them. 
While the proposition and existing meetings law provided for public “notice” 
and public “access,” the issue of public participation remained open,277 prompting 
the district to try to set some rules regarding how and when audience members 
might chip in. DCTA didn’t agree to any.278 Initially, this resulted only in the 
addition of a microphone at the back of a grade-school cafeteria, flipped-on at 
prearranged times for scripted testimonials before the six union and five district 
negotiators up front.279 But then came homemade signs, a smartphone balanced 
on a tripod, and—ironically, from the “no-peanut” gallery—some spontaneity.280 
“Can I give some examples?” rose a voice from the folding chairs, before 
questioning a district negotiator’s assumption to nodding heads.281 “It’s supposed 
to be about the kids,” said another taking the microphone, “trembling with 
emotion.”282 
Confronting 100-person crowds and discussion so rollicking that, as the anti-
union Freedom Foundation complained, most states would “not tolerate[]” it, the 
district turned outwardly practical, telling reporters that “[k]nowing what 
teachers feel strong about helps . . . identify the most critical areas of the 
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contract.”283 Inwardly, frustration seemed to have set in. In an unprecedented 
move, the district unilaterally declared an impasse, triggering closed-door 
mediation284 and ending both audience participation and a FacebookLive feed 
that had attracted as many as 2,200 viewers.285 
Declaring itself “blindsided,” the union accused the district of trying to hide 
negotiations to “silence” the community.286  It was a striking role reversal. “We 
want this process to continue,” DCTA’s deputy director explained. “We want the 
public comment.”287 
Hidden or not, the ultimate agreement produced “the most generous 
compensation package for teachers” around.288 The union, at least, certified 
Proposition 104  a success: “Some people always say we have something to hide, 
and that’s not true. I think this process proves that.”289 
 2. Minnesota 
Minnesota’s law is decades older290 and its unions, as a result, have had more 
practice. The St. Paul Federation of Teachers (SPFT) began inviting parents of 
special education students to negotiations in 2009, and two years later the union 
successfully moved all sessions to Thursdays at five p.m.—catching community 
supporters right after work.291 Since then, the very notion of discussing contract 
issues in private has become not just alien but a leverage point for protest, 
mobilization, and innovative benefits. 
The 2013 contract was a tipping point. To prepare, SPFT first took a page 
from CTU by breaking into book groups.292 Early on, teachers decided to bring 
neighborhood and non-profit leaders into the circles, and the union’s bargaining 
priorities flowed from those 8-months of discussions.293 On the one hand, drawing 
demands directly from community stakeholders created a compelling incentive 
for broad audience participation in contract negotiations. It also, however, 
created a platform flush with permissive topics.294 Unimpressed, the district 
 
 283.  Asmar, supra note 275.  
 284.  Melanie Asmar, Impasse declared, prompting criticism from union, CHALKBEAT (Jun. 27, 2017) 
[hereinafter Impasse], https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2017/06/27/impasse-declared-in-denver-
teacher-contract-negotiations-prompting-criticism-from-union/ [https://perma.cc/JA2Z-YXWA]. 
 285.  Asmar, supra note 275.  
 286.  Impasse, supra note 284.  
 287.  Asmar, supra note 275.  
 288.  Monte Whaley, Denver teachers, administrators reach new agreement, DEN. POST (Sep. 1, 2017).  
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Up until 1981, unions and employers could not even hold strategy sessions in private. What 
Constitutes a ‘Meeting’ Under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law? Note, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 251, 
252 (1985).  
 291.  Mary Cathryn Ricker, Teacher-Community Unionism: A Lesson from St. Paul, DISSENT 
(Summer 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/teacher-community-unionism-lesson-st-paul 
[https://perma.cc/6Y7S-R548].  
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Eric S. Fought, All Hands on Deck, AM. EDUCATOR (Fall 2015), at 22, 
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/ae_fall2015fought.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LEA-QMY2]. 
89 - BOOK PROOF - OSWALT - ALT-BARGAINING (DO NOT DELETE) 8/14/2019  10:08 AM 
No. 3 2019] ALT-BARGAINING 121 
rejected twenty of the union’s twenty-nine proposals out-of-hand and replaced 
its chief negotiator with a lawyer.295 When parents and community members 
stood-up and pressed the issues nonetheless, the district moved for mediation, 
kicking everyone out of the room.296  
But what the district conceived as de-escalation, the union saw as a hook for 
escalation. As school officials prepped to meet the mediator, SPFT rallied its 
network, and the press, to show up at the first session and present a letter 
reiterating the twenty blocked demands.297 Amid blinking iPhones and a 
smattering of “gasps,” district leaders walked in—then immediately walked out—
leaving the assembled teachers, students, and activists to repurpose their 
prepared testimony for reporters.298  
The group was also, as SPFT’s president described, left to “brainstorm . . .  
ways to continue the public dialogue . . . now that open negotiations were no 
longer possible.”299 School board meetings, for example, 
remained public and perfectly situated for petition deliveries.300 So were 
porches (for sharing stories),301 the internet (for videos dramatizing a demand a 
week),302 and snowbanks (for make-your-own-signs, like “St. Paul kids 
deserve ___”).303 By early-2014, allies who “didn’t appreciate having their ideas 
cast aside” found them back at the center, only chanted, sung, and tweeted by 
2,500 teachers, parents, students, and activists in crowded school lobbies during 
a blizzard.304    
Numbers-wise, the union ultimately won a good contract. The district agreed 
to $22 million in new compensation, up from $13.9 million the previous round.305 
The non-compensation provisions were more telling. The district had tried, and 
failed, to ignore non-mandatory demands on class size, parental involvement in 
discipline,306 and teacher-led home visits,307 reducing to writing what the Twin 
Cities press described as, “a wider array of issues than perhaps any other teacher 
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 296.  Id.  
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Fought, supra note 294, at 22.  
 301.  Ricker, supra note 291. 
 302.  Fought, supra note 294, at 22.  
 303.  Ricker, supra note 291. 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Mila Koumpilova, St. Paul teachers contract, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 23, 2014), 
https://www.twincities.com/2014/02/23/st-paul-teachers-contract-smaller-class-sizes-8-6-compensation-
increase/ [https://perma.cc/VK6X-35TE].  
 306.  Id. See also Mila Koumpilova, St. Paul parents hope to keep momentum after teachers contract, 
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 2, 2014), https://www.twincities.com/2014/03/02/st-paul-parents-
hope-to-keep-momentum-after-teachers-contract-deal/ [https://perma.cc/DDK3-YJBU]. 
 307.  Sarah Jaffe, Teachers’ Strikes, Catching Fire, WORKING IN THESE TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014), 
http://inthesetimes.com/article/16402/teachers_strikes_catching_fire [https://perma.cc/NX8A-5GUV]. 
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labor agreement in the state.”308 Or, as SPFT and many of its allies recognized it, 
book club come to life.309 
IV 
“ALT” AND INTEREST DYNAMICS 
So far, I have suggested that alt-labor represents three new relationships to 
law in organizing. This has led to alternative conceptions of membership, 
alternative assumptions about where collective progress is possible, and 
alternative beliefs about how law might empower workers. These core alt-labor 
characteristics can now be spotted in settings of group demands. With the 
historically mirrored nature of mobilization and negotiation strategies in the 
background, the developments may mark the rise of “alt-bargaining.” 
Each campaign highlighted in Part III contained a narrative thread useful to 
draw out one quality or another of alt-bargaining. But the three new legal 
orientations also share a unifying theme. CTU, #RedForEd, SPFT and DCTA 
pressed for community, not just workplace benefits. Others have trumpeted this 
phenomenon and, as noted, it even has a name: common good bargaining.310 As 
those commentators acknowledge,311 there is not much new about labor’s 
incorporation of interests other than its own. For decades unions have lobbied 
for Medicare, food stamps, and higher minimum wages though the policies 
impact few, if any, members directly.312 Boycott rhetoric has long been suffused 
with a target’s impact on women, minorities, the environment, or international 
affairs.313 In 1999, four unions set up shop in the same small office in Stamford 
and spent a year organizing to save two public housing complexes and shift 
millions of state dollars into affordable developments.314 
But now that community agenda is on the table, breaking the employer-union 
bargaining dyad wide open on one side. What results is partly a traditional 
coalition of shared values, but even more an unconventional collection of self-
interests, newly aligned in a surprising setting. Others have contended that the 
inclusion of concrete, outside interests in bargaining is not simply an important 
development but a difference-maker for the labor movement going forward.315 I 
 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  See Ricker, supra note 291 (citing “progress in every priority area advanced by the study 
groups”).  
 310.  McCartin, supra note 98. See also Kimberly Sanchez-Ocasio & Leo Gertner, Fighting for the 
Common Good, 126 YALE L. J. FORUM 503, 504–06 (2017) (describing, more broadly, the rise of union 
campaigns that “address[] social conditions whether or not they are directly related to traditional terms 
and conditions of employment”). 
 311.  See, e.g., McCartin, supra note 98 (noting that the “spirit . . . recall[s] a venerable tradition”).  
 312.  ROSENFELD, supra note 24, at 50, 160.  
 313.  James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 892–93, 
902–06 (1991).  
 314.  Janice Fine, Contemporary Community Unionism: Some Lessons from Baltimore and Stamford,  
PARTNERING FOR CHANGE: UNIONS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS BUILD COALITIONS FOR ECONOMIC 
JUSTICE 165, 178–80 (David B. Reynolds, ed. 2004).   
 315.  See, e.g., Stephen Lerner, Injury to All: Going Beyond Collective Bargaining As We Know It, 19 
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agree, but this essential, embedded feature of alt-bargaining could benefit from 
unpacking. Because self-interest can be more than an instrument useful in 
gathering a coalition. Interests can also be transformed, aligned, and leveraged 
to empower it. It is ultimately this practice of making individual concerns 
common that drives the sustainability of alt-bargaining’s three legal orientations 
going forward. 
A. Self-Interest in Organizing 
For social theorists, the significance of self-interest—as opposed to, say, 
ideology—in activism is foundational and implicated in the development of many 
movement-building accounts.316 Labor coalition theories exhibit a similar 
tension, often distinguishing between campaigns based on the degree to which 
allied groups can expect material gains from eventual union success.317 Social 
movement unionism alliances, for example, are sometimes labeled “vanguard” 
coalitions,318 a nod to labor in the lead and allies “add[ed]-on to the pursuit of 
union goals,” exclusively.319 
When West Virginia workers win pay demands but stay on strike until others 
do too, or when teachers propose twenty provisions for the community and nine 
for themselves, it’s clear alt-bargaining is expanding the circle of coalitional 
interests. As a bargaining innovation, the move could be viewed cynically—an 
enticement to swarm an open mic, a sweetener to show-up at a rally, or an 
incentive write a representative. But the evidence suggests that’s not how tying 
demands to outsiders’ self-interest is playing out. 
Instead, alt-bargaining leaders seem to have recognized what community 
organizers have long known: self-interest can be used strategically and without 
exploitation in organizing.320 There, interests are about relationships, not 
individualism. Desires develop experientially, through interactions with others. 
True “self”-interest requires both a recognition and a degree of differentiation 
from what others want.321 Self-interest, as Dennis Jacobson puts it, is not 
 
NEW LAB. FORUM 45, 46 (2010) (“Communities and allies must become invested . . . as a way to achieve 
their own self-interests.”). 
 316. See Edward Rubin, Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–
17, 25–33 (2001) (tracing the role of self-interest and ideology in the development of resource-
mobilization, framing, and critical theories of movement-building); Sheryll Cashin, Transcending Race, 
Class, and Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 278 (2005) (“The most 
significant debate in the political science literature about multiracial coalitions is whether interest or 
ideology is the more effective motivating force. . .”). 
 317.  Carola Frege, et al., Comparative Coalition Building and the Revitalization of the Labor 
Movement, IRRA 55th Annual Proceedings 122, 124–25 (2003), http://lerachapters.org/OJS/ojs-2.4.4-
1/index.php/PFL/article/view/542/538 [https://perma.cc/E9HP-RBG6]. 
 318.  Bruce Nissen, Labor-Community Coalition Strengths and Weaknesses in Reynolds, supra note 
314, at 55. 
 319.  AMANDA TATTERSALL, POWER IN COALITION: STRATEGIES FOR STRONG UNIONS AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 9–11 (2011). 
 320.  PAUL OSTERMAN, GATHERING POWER: THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN 
AMERICA 49–51 (2002). 
 321.  MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVITALIZE 
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selfishness, which “denies the ‘other,’” nor selflessness, which “denies the ‘self,’” 
but something in-between.322 
At meetings, this principle plays out in real time, as members sit in twos 
sharing personal histories before linking the stories to interests in cheaper rent, 
easier commutes, or safer streets.323 The organizing key is for activists to see that 
all the stories, and all the interests, connect. Visitors to a training are likely to see 
easels filled with furiously crisscrossing stick diagrams of interests flowing 
upwards to converge on a handful of actors or entities reliant on regressive policy 
commitments to maintain the status quo.324 This sort of “power analysis”  is meant 
to seed notions of self-interest that are longer-term, broader, and necessarily 
more mutual than participants may have first identified.325 
The revelation can also happen organically. Storytelling does not stop when 
the group reassembles. There are just more listeners, more vulnerabilities, and, 
most critically, more echoes.326 As theologian Jeffrey Stout recounts, 
Initially there might seem to be a series of disconnected individuals, relating stories 
about particular events they have experienced. But, with any luck, two sorts of 
connections will begin to take shape: emotional connections among the individuals who 
are mirroring one another’s concerns, but also thematic connections among the stories, 
a number of which now appear to be about something more than the particulars referred 
to explicitly in them.327 
Religious institutions are home-base for much community organizing,328 and 
for many that “something more” may translate into a faith-value, like a “theology 
of housing” as one activist has put it.329 But secular frames, like equality in 
housing, or, as some scholars have suggested, a “common good” right to be free 
from economic domination, work as well.330 
The challenge is to concentrate these values “into a zone that is neither 
completely abstract, and thus inattentive to the particularity of the stories being 
told, nor so focused on the distinctness of each story that no connections among 
stories can be made explicit.”331 Stories about bad schools may energize the 
pursuit of justice, but a talented organizer must translate that passion into a drive 
to reverse “what the school system is doing,” specifically, to disadvantaged 
 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 224 (2001) (“[T]rainers stress that the Latin root of the word interest is 
interesse, which means ‘to be among or between.’”). 
 322.  DENNIS A. JACOBSEN, DOING JUSTICE 51 (2001). 
 323.  WARREN, supra note 321, at 224.  
 324.  Id. 
 325.  JEFFREY STOUT, BLESSED ARE THE ORGANIZED: GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
41 (2010). See also JACOBSEN, supra note 322, at 54.  
 326.  STOUT, supra note 325, at 155.  
 327.  Id.  
 328.  Two of the largest national networks, the Industrial Areas Foundation and Gamaliel, ground 
their work, at least initially, in religious institutions. Warren, supra note 321, at 47-71; Cashin, supra note 
316, at 286–87.   
 329.  WARREN, supra note 321, at 58. 
 330.  See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 325, at 41; CHRIS SHANNAHAN, A THEOLOGY OF COMMUNITY 
ORGANIZING: POWER TO THE PEOPLE 69 (2013).   
 331.  STOUT, supra note 325, at 157.  
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students right now.332  When it works, self-interests that were once individual, and 
then philosophical, become grounded and common. 
B. Self- to Common-Interests in Labor Coalitions 
The progression from self to shared interests is not limited to community 
organizing. That it can be applied in the context of labor coalitions, specifically, 
is suggested by some recent case studies, which identify the depth of a campaign’s 
“common concern”—defined as the degree to which a coalition’s goals reflect the 
“mutual self-interest” of participants and the public—as a major factor in its 
likely success.333 
A good example comes from the four-year, multi-union crash course on 
coalition strength and shared self-interest spurred by Walmart’s low-wage 
incursion into the Chicago market in 2003. UFCW, the retail and grocery union, 
faced the most immediate threat, and its first move was to gather-up groups to 
challenge the company’s plans under city zoning laws.334 While so-called “site 
fights” had been somewhat successful in Southern California,335 here organizers 
faced immediate ambivalence. For one, Walmart’s proposals zeroed-in on the 
city’s depressed, mostly African-American south and west sides, where residents 
saw the stores as a consumer oasis, and a cheap one at that.336 ACORN, the most 
effective community organization at the time, was deeply divided over 
participation and joined only grudgingly, unable to activate its members after an 
intensive education effort.337 The powerful clergy community was even less 
energized, desperate for jobs—any jobs—for its congregants and accepting of 
financial “donations” direct from Bentonville.338 The lack of unity made the 
negative, “No-Walmart” messaging vulnerable to charges of racism, which 
Walmart lobbed freely against the largely white union officials.339 While one 
south-side project was scrapped, about a dozen more eventually went through.340 
Though organizers reflected on the zoning strategy with regret,341 its failure 
fueled a more cohesive formula. If the unions couldn’t stop Walmart, perhaps 
they could lessen its impact. In 2004, labor changed course to push legislation 
mandating a ten dollar minimum wage, plus three dollars in benefits, for “big-
 
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Tattersall, supra note 319, at 26, 21–22 (identifying “scale” and “organizational relationships and 
structure” as the other key attributes).   
 334.  Id. at 74–75. 
 335.  Scott Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the 
Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1927, 1929–30 (2007).   
 336.  Tattersall, supra note 319, at 76, 77. 
 337.  Id. at 75, 77. 
 338.  Id. at 79-80. 
 339.  Id. at 78, 80. 
 340.  Id. at 81; Walmart.com, Storefinder, Chicago, https://www.walmart.com/store/finder?location= 
60606&distance=50 (on file with author). 
 341.  TATTERSALL, supra note 319, at 77–78. 
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box” stores like Walmart.342 The shift paid immediate coalitional dividends. 
ACORN, having “built its name” on living wage work, mobilized its membership 
easily, as did a major immigrant alliance fresh off organizing the city-wide “Day 
Without Immigrants” workplace strike. 343 
Union members required a more personalized pitch. At Local 880, a “general 
rap” about inadequate city minimums drove zero participants to a rally.344 But 
when better pay at Walmart was linked to “mak[ing] it easier to push wages up 
in our industry,” dozens of home- and child-care workers started showing up to 
events.345 
For these actors, an evident or educated self-interest in higher wages 
motivated involvement. Living wages also smoothly converted into a moral value 
that, this time, garnered clergy support, tied on-the-fence politicians into knots, 
and made canvassing the public a relative breeze (ACORN organizers carried 
extra cell-phones for on-the-spot lobby calls).346 Yet, as sociologist Amanda 
Tattersall reported, the actual “issue of living wages did not overlap with the 
issues that many of the [other coalition] partners were focused on.”347 Instead, a 
“remarkably strong set of organizational relationships” allowed campaigners to 
translate particular living wage self-interests, and general living wage values, into 
a “shared organizational interest in building social and political power” long-term 
in Chicago.348 So, while the Chicago Federation of Labor, a union umbrella-
group, did not have worker-members to protect or mobilize, it did confront a 
weakened grip on the council that a campaign role could help revitalize.349 At 
major rallies, speakers touched on topics spanning the military to trains, but 
everyone was up for signing postcards that distilled the common political-
economy denominator: no Alderman will survive a “no” vote.350 
From a living wage perspective, the campaign’s victory was moral. The mayor 
was forced to veto legislation for the first time in seventeen years, and an override 
failed by one vote.351 But from a coalition perspective, the “broadest labor 
participation and the broadest community participation” in memory suggested 
that the real winner was the transformation of self- to shared-concern.352 
 
 342.  See Erik Eckholm, Chicago Orders “Big-Box” Stores to Raise Wages, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 27, 2006). 
 343.  TATTERSALL, supra note 319, at 82, 87; Michael Martinez, Rallies draw over 1 million, CHI. 
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 344.  TATTERSALL, supra note 319, at 87. 
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 350.  Id. at 63-64. 
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 352.  TATTERSALL, supra note 319, at 99. Tattersall agrees: “I argue that success cannot be measured 
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to dramatically change the political climate.” Id. at 98. 
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C. Self- to Common-Interests in Alt-Bargaining 
Alt-bargaining seems to be drawing from a similar playbook. In various ways, 
and surely in fits and starts, the campaigns can be seen as experimenting with 
shifts from self- to common-interests in coalition. Like any workplace, where alt-
bargaining emerges there are stories, frustrations, and anecdotes passed in 
hallways, breakrooms, and on-line. Like any workplace, many interests—pay, 
insurance, favoritism—are obvious. There may not be easels to connect the dots, 
but in St. Paul, Phoenix, and elsewhere, book clubs, moderated Facebook groups, 
and even viral memes get behind those grievances to reveal a bank, funder, or 
legislator. Chicago teachers of course didn’t want their schools to close, but Shock 
Doctrine and retreats exposed reform as a business boon and led them to reject 
a thirty-five percent raise, potentially break the law, and embrace community 
because of it. Minnesota teachers cut out the middleman by inviting community 
into the book club in the first instance and melding demands from there. West 
Virginia teachers hadn’t had a raise in years, but a “Resting Mitch Face” helped 
unify the fight—and the solution. 
To the extent these and other approaches can be labeled “power analyses,” 
they range from the informal to the ad hoc. But, as the “common good” moniker 
itself suggests,353 the book clubs, Facebook groups, and other methods seem to 
be working. Outside observers writing about the campaigns identify not “parent” 
or “teacher” demands but “negotiations for broader, shared gains.”354 After a 
50,000-person march in Phoenix, Slate.com asked a cross-section of high-school 
and elementary teachers to state their main demand. The uniform answer—from 
three, presumably practiced, leaders but also many merely inspired 
participants—would have provoked applause at all but the most conservative 
community gatherings: a sustainable school funding source.355 The real tells, 
though, are the results. The extra-workplace demands could easily be foils traded 
off for more pay or fewer standardized tests. But they are deal-breakers, often 
pushed at the expense of considerable legal risk. SPFT might have thanked moms 
and dads for putting up yard-signs, dropped their desire to participate in school 
discipline, and stretched new compensation an extra half-million. But SPFT’s 
members didn’t do that. They’d spent an hour discussing Chapter 7 of Alfie 
 
 353.  Bargaining for the Common Good, http://www.bargainingforthecommongood.org 
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Kohn’s The Schools Our Children Deserve356 and realized that this seemingly 
outside interest was also their own.357 
V 
THE FUTURE 
It is the capacity to turn individual interests communal and, in turn, gather 
more than a few crowds, that undergirds alt-bargaining’s sustainability, 
particularly in the face of legal risks. The power to strike over permissible 
demands or to strike without the right to strike at all relies, in practice, on mass 
support as a counter-force. How far that principle can be pushed is not clear, but 
it is worth considering where alt-bargaining might go in the medium and long 
term. 
One stop is surely the private sector. Opportunities in the public sector are 
ultimately tied to budgets, and budgets are increasingly shaped by private 
institutions. Already campaigns make large companies and banks secondary or 
even joint-targets, spotlighting the role of tax avoidance and exorbitant fees in 
immiserating public services.358 The parent unions of CTU, SPFT, AEU, and the 
others represent thousands of non-public workers in hospitals, universities, and 
charters right now.359 Most importantly, nothing about alt-bargaining is limited to 
particular employers. A website broadcasts victories, a training curriculum 
teaches best practices, and regional leaders gather regularly to spread lessons and 
challenges.360 
More questions surround the organizational structures of future campaigns. 
Were permissive demands, jurisdictional innovation, and doctrinal optimism to 
become standard bargaining table practice, heavy community participation 
would need to be become equally regular. A pressing issue is how that might be 
sustained and, relatedly, where everyone might sit. 
Central to alt-bargaining’s achievements is the ennobling, yet strategic, use of 
self-interest. CTU, #RedForEd, and the Denver teachers had success not just 
because they made broad demands, but because some of those demands were of 
direct concern to outsiders. However, because much of alt-bargaining’s 
momentum has developed on the fly, initial links between specific demands and 
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specific community segments are blurry and potentially underdeveloped. When 
West Virginia’s teachers won their raise and kept striking until it was extended 
to others, perhaps state workers would have preferred a dental plan. Maybe an 
additional demand would have added contracted employees to the fight. There 
was no natural mechanism to find out. 
One solution would be to make space for community groups at the table, and 
some have suggested expanding collective bargaining to include non-profits, 
neighborhood associations, and even other local businesses.361 Amid the rapid 
deindustrialization of the 1980s, then-United Mine Workers President Trumka 
supported federal legislation mandating community negotiations prior to a shut-
down.362 
There may be a way, however, to sustain deep community involvement 
through targeted interests and local voice without fundamentally upending the 
existing architecture of U.S. labor relations: pool voting. 
A. Pool Voting 
Pool voting expands the universe of people eligible to ratify collective 
bargaining agreements from members of the relevant bargaining unit to some 
other, usually much larger, group. In the most famous example, striking locals 
representing different plants at International Paper agreed to merge into a single 
voting unit so that no one local could accept an offer unless a majority of all 
members, across all locals, agreed.363 Echoing the structure of recent campaigns, 
the alt-bargaining variant would probably have the union at the negotiating table, 
alone, pressing demands to be voted on by both members and outside groups. 
But what groups, and what demands? That should depend on who speaks up 
and what, exactly, they say they want. Ideally, unions already have a sense of local 
needs through members’ existing external relationships364 or, failing that, the 
newspaper.  But a more outside-in approach to priorities would foster 
“community demands” in the most actualized sense. A possible model comes 
from the remarkable story of Teamsters Local 688 in 1950s St. Louis, which 
sought to cultivate members’ dual-nature as “worker-citizens” by bringing “shop-
 
 361.  See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
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Paper, 309 N.L.R.B. 44, 44 (1992). 
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floor expertise” to bear on neighborhood issues in astonishingly literal senses.365 
Residents could fill-out a “community grievance form” and deliver it to a 
“community steward” who would “then take the grievance to the union and then 
the appropriate city agency for redress.”366 An inadequate response moved the 
complaint to higher rungs of authority, from supervisors, to elected officials, to 
judges, and ultimately voters.367 Early on the union resolved around 250 issues 
ranging from unsafe sidewalks to uncollected trash, but as the program matured 
the grievances expanded. And so did the grievants.368 The near-death of an infant 
from rat bites turned a generalized public housing anxiety into a concrete 
complaint backed by the vocal support of the NAACP, the UAW, the 
Metropolitan Church Federation, and the press.369 Subsequent efforts to get the 
city to enforce its existing rodent regulations burnished Local 688’s reputation as 
a “staunch defender of the community’s safety and well-being” and served as 
proof of concept for Local 688’s vision of a “community bargaining table”: 
unionists and citizens allied “to define and negotiate the terms of a social 
contract” with public officials.370 
As historian Robert Bussel tells it, the union’s creative turn to community 
arose in part from leaders’ presumptions about the continued stability (and even 
strengthening) of workplace collective bargaining relative to weakening state 
support for urban communities.371 The modern balance is different. Corporate 
power has crushed private sector collective bargaining and often exerts 
difference-making authority over the levers of local governments. Uber,372 
Amazon,373 and trade associations374 have bewildered activists by winning 
reversals of regulatory, legislative, and referendum victories with shocking speed. 
Today’s corporations are both “mega”375 and exert “octopus-like” control over 
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as one strand in a long tradition of “[e]fforts to fuse the interests of union and community.” McCartin, 
supra note 98.  
 366.  BUSSEL, supra note 365, at 88.   
 367.  Id. at 88–89. 
 368.  Id. at 90–92. 
 369.  Id. at 93–94. 
 370.  Id. at 93–95.  
 371.  BUSSEL, supra note 365, at 88. 
 372.  Olivia Solon, How Uber conquers a city in seven steps, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/12/why-everyone-hates-uber-seven-step-playbook 
[https://perma.cc/KL32-RZ6M].  
 373.  David Streitfeld, Seattle Officials Repeal Tax That Upset Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (June, 12, 2018).  
 374.  Fenit Nirappil, D.C. Council overturns wage hike for bartenders, servers—four months after 
voters approved it, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2018).  
 375.  Matt Phillips, Apple’s $1 Trillion Milestone Reflects the Rise of Powerful megacompanies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018) (“Today, a smaller cluster of American companies commands a larger share of 
total corporate profits than since at least the 1970s.”).  
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smaller entities, “increasingly impacting not just employment conditions, but 
housing affordability, credit availability, infrastructure, and the environment.”376 
But that, as long-time community and union activist Stephen Lerner has said, 
also makes for especially juicy targets impacting especially varied 
constituencies—and interests.377 Lerner’s focus is the shadowy world of private 
equity, but take a more rooted company like Whole Foods, where fledging 
unionization efforts have emerged.378 Certifying merely a single unit at the 
aggressively non-union grocery would be a historic organizing development. 
Under standard bargaining theory, it would also be precarious.379 But alt-
bargaining augurs something different. Even the smallest, most isolated, 
organized unit forces the company to sit down and negotiate.380 For alt-
bargaining, that duty is like a green light to declare the neighborhood Whole 
Foods open for community business and the union open to suggestions. A local 
food bank may have some ideas for the table, but so might a homeless 
organization that has been asking the grocer’s parent, Amazon, to support a 
county housing initiative. Maybe employees at a nearby Zappos facility—another 
Amazon offspring—want parental leave. The universe of potential requests and 
requestors is seemingly great, and it corresponds with the potential universe of 
those with tangible incentives to pressure Whole Foods for a good contract. That 
could be a lot of pressure. 
Importantly, because each outside ask comes with new entrants to the voting 
pool, incentives flow in the opposite direction too. The union will surely be 
cognizant that failing to make good on, say, the food bank’s proposal could lose 
votes. But few negotiations result in complete victories. As the pool diversifies so 
does the danger that those with the narrowest interests will view the tentative 
agreement as a personal loss. That, though, just converts the union’s transactional 
incentive to pack the agreement with as much as it can into a relational incentive 
to transform initially differentiated desires into common, shared stakes. While 
the transactional incentive is likely to leave resentments in its wake, the relational 
incentive, as taught in Part IV, can unite. 
B. The Long-Term 
Community-based pool voting can, rightly, be seen as an innovative, 
community-enhancing contract strategy. But it also gestures towards a much 
more ambitious era of union-centered progressivism. The post-1960s 
“proliferation of movements, causes, and political identities”381 makes it easy to 
 
 376.  Teke Wiggin, The Silver Lining of the New Gilded Age, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 22, 2018).  
 377.  Id.  
 378.  Matt Day, Group of Whole Foods workers aims to unionize, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018); 
Mugambi Mutegi, ‘Fight for $15’ begins 2nd round in Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (Jul. 31, 2013).   
 379.  Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 679, 700–01 (2014) (describing 
how wage gains isolated to a single unit in a non-union market is predicted to lead to job losses, negative 
wage pressures, and dwindling employee support). 
 380.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 
 381.  L.A. KAUFMAN, DIRECT ACTION: PROTEST AND THE REINVENTION OF AMERICAN 
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depict the modern Left as fractured382 or directionless.383 Yet, as L.A. Kaufman 
has recently argued,  multiplicity—even multiplicity at cross-purposes—can be a 
feature of protest, a “source of political validation and strength,” not a bug.384 
The anti-globalization movement at the millennium’s turn is emblematic, 
particularly the so-called “Battle for Seattle,”385 where some 40,000 anti-nuke, 
anarchist, Central American, peace, feminist, and, famously, “Teamster and 
turtle” activists forced the November 30, 1999 World Trade Organization 
meeting to disband.386 Lost in the apparent “hodgepodge of groups” and chaos of 
the streets—the protests have been dubbed “the Occupy Wall Street of their 
time”387—was how activists “smoothly and brilliantly” divided city blocks “like 
pieces of pie,” assigning “clusters of affinity groups” to take “responsibility” for 
blocking delegates’ path to the summit in “each wedge.”388 
For Kaufman, the experience teaches that a differentiated unity, even among 
thousands of participants, is possible, so long as organizers trade the need for 
issue and even tactical convergence for general agreement on one “very concrete 
objective”—at the WTO, disruption—plus an overarching “vision of systemic 
change.”389 That is a tall order. In Seattle it took months of inter-group planning 
sessions and a week-long, in-person training in an east-side warehouse.390 But 
where the right object and the right vision take root, the lived experience is 
empowerment through diversity. As one activist reflected, it was “very instructive 
for a lot of people that it can be done, that we don’t all have to be on one program, 
we don’t all have to have one message, we don’t all have to have one tactic.”391 
 
RADICALISM ix (2017). 
 382.  Political scientist Sara Watson calls “a divided left, in which parties and unions are seeking to 
mobilize different constituencies in which left parties are themselves divided between moderate and far-
left groups with conflicting interests . . . common in welfare states outside of Northern Europe.” SARA 
E. WATSON, THE LEFT DIVIDED: THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF ADVANCED 
WELFARE STATES xviii (2015). Others have identified leftist divisions in the political economy, Pete 
Davis, The liberal-left divide reshaping American politics, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2017), and among 
radicals. MILTON CANTOR, THE DIVIDED LEFT: AMERICAN RADICALISM, 1900-1975, 6 (1978) 
(depicting the “recurring” and ultimately fatal American radicalist “dilemma—the relation between 
ultimate goals and immediate methods, orthodoxy and opportunism”).   
 383.  KAUFMAN, supra note 381, at  ix–x (“At times, it can seem like the number of recent radicalisms 
stands in inverse proportion to their overall influence.”).  
 384.  Id. at 136. 
 385.  ADAM REICH & PETER BEARMAN, WORKING FOR RESPECT: COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT AT 
WALMART 9 (2018).  
 386.  KAUFMAN, supra note 381, at 144.  
 387.  Noah Smith, The Dark Side of Globalization: Why Seattle’s 1999 Protesters Were Right, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2014).  
 388.  KAUFMAN, supra note 381, at 144–45, 149. 
 389.  Id. at 147. Kaufman is clear that not all relationships went smoothly. Labor leaders were upset 
that street blockades interfered with a major march, and some groups ignored official commands to 
protect private property, providing a convenient excuse for police to unleash tear gas and rubber bullets. 
Id. at 146, 149–50. 
 390.  Id. at 143–44.  
 391.  Id. at 147. 
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Alt-bargaining might eventually cultivate these insights on a mass scale. Right 
now, lots of organizations might want to demand things from a large company 
like Exxon. But, again, federal law does not require Exxon to negotiate with the 
Sierra Club. It requires Exxon to negotiate with unions. The labor movement 
therefore has an opportunity to position itself as something like an all-purpose 
progressive agent, a go-between cloaked by law to traverse the divide between 
public and corporate interests. Mega-corps might come to be seen not simply as 
job or service providers but as resource extraction points, with demands 
reviewed, renewed, or changed every three years. 
What gets contributed would ultimately be a function of the bargaining 
“team’s” power. But since the negotiation obligation repeats, the team can 
expand or contract its size and tactics over time, as opportunity and experience 
dictate. A climate change organization might try apocalypse-themed ads or street 
theater to demand Exxon’s support for a federal carbon tax, realize the public is 
better engaged by exposed hypocrisy, and switch to teach-ins. Imagine the anti-
sex discrimination organization TIMES UP capitalizing on data leaks by 
demanding the gold standard in pay transparency and marching with Black Lives 
Matter. Alt-bargaining allows many demands and much activism to be handed-
off, while the careful work of CTU, #RedforEd, and many more unions across 
the country show how an underlying, dual-focused unity can nevertheless remain: 
a standard focus on a collective bargaining agreement, and an audacious focus on 
a massive conglomerate’s relationship to the public. The labor movement could 
sit at the center of all of it. 
C. Challenges 
This future sketch is, admittedly, aspirational. To this point, overwhelming 
public support has probably papered over a number of basic legal challenges that 
would become more acute in the unelected private sector. Primarily, the demands 
that would originally animate outside groups are the very demands the company 
could freely ignore. 
Precedent is precedent, but it’s worth noting that time has tarnished the 
problem case, NLRB v. Borg-Warner, more than most. Divvying demands 
between “mandatory,” strike-enabling things that affect “terms and conditions of 
employment” and “non-mandatory” things that don’t was always textually 
suspect392 and practically strange.393 Before the decision Archibald Cox warned 
 
 392.  As Archibald Cox and others have said, Congress likely listed subjects in Section 8(d) as 
minimums for good faith negotiations and, at the very least, did not intend to prohibit unions from 
resorting to economic pressure over other subjects. See Cox & Dunlop, supra note 106, at 1078, 1081–83; 
Note, Major Operational Decisions and Free Collective Bargaining, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1971, 1973–76 
(1989) [hereinafter Major Operational]. 
 393.  For one, a right to insist only on “mandatory” topics obviously invites rhetorical mischief, like 
oblique mentions of key permissive demands under cover of more explicitly conveyed—but, as everyone 
understands, less important—mandatory topics. See, e.g., Major Operational, supra note 392, at 1984; 
Note, Application of the Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy to the Duty to Bargain, 15 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 918, 937–45 (1974) (describing many other “deficiencies”). As Justice Harlan noted in dissent, 
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the Board against meddling with bargaining scope,394 and after he just lamented: 
“[c]ollective bargaining is too dynamic for us to decide today what should be 
required or permissible . . . tomorrow.”395 Later cases compounded the damage 
by ignoring congressional calls to consider work “conditions” broadly, “left in the 
first instance to employers and trade-unions” with a view to “the social and 
political climate at any given time.”396 
The decision remains, but we could at least start acknowledging that 
increasingly the social and political climate is that community conditions are work 
conditions. Trade-unions certainly think so. That’s why a Teamsters local 
declared itself a “sanctuary union,” began challenging Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agents at worksites, and started picketing detention centers.397 It’s 
why SEIU spends millions raising wages for non-members398 and winning laws 
letting non-union workers support community organizations through payroll 
deductions.399 It’s why alt-labor—non-union through and through—would 
probably collapse without traditional labor’s money. And it’s why the largest 
union federation nearly granted internal voting rights to the NAACP and Sierra 
Club.400 Today, notions embedded in decisional law that unions don’t know 
enough,401 or lack interests enough,402 to deserve a say in how companies benefit 
or don’t benefit third-parties is pure anachronism. The irony is that when big 
companies want something, they bargain with communities—and dangle things 
like parks and rec centers—all the time. They even call the contracts “CBAs.”403 
The cleanest escape would be for the NLRB to accept that something like 
funding a child care center is not “indirect or incidental” to “conditions of 
 
“‘bargaining’ which enables one to ‘propose’ a particular point but not ‘insist’ on it” is not, actually, 
“bargaining.” Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 724.  
 394.  Cox & Dunlop, supra note 106, at 406 (“If capital and labor are able to adjust questions 
concerning the allocation of responsibilities to their mutual satisfaction, society will gain nothing by 
imposing different answers.”). 
 395.  Cox, supra note 106, at 1084. 
 396.  First Nat’l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 n. 14 (1981).  
 397.  Ginger Adams Otis, Teamsters form ‘sanctuary union’ to fight ICE agents, N.Y. DAILY NEWS  
(Feb. 10, 2018).  
 398.  NELP, DataBrief, Impact of the Fight for $15, (Nov. 2018), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/Data-Brief-Impact-Fight-for-15-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QUB-LL9F]. 
 399.  Steven Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Claim Victory, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018).  
 400.  Susan Page, AFL-CIO leader seeks to expand membership beyond unions, USA TODAY (Aug. 
7, 2013).  
 401.  See, e.g., UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing “subject areas as to 
which determinative financial and operational considerations are likely to be unfamiliar to the employees 
and their representatives”).  
 402.  See First Nat’l Maintenance Corp., 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“I cannot agree with 
this [balancing] test, because it takes into account only the interests of management; it fails to consider 
the legitimate interests of the workers and their union.”) 
 403.  CBAs or “community benefit agreements” are private contracts negotiated between businesses 
and community groups to smooth approval of development projects. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY 
POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 156 (2016). Neighborhoods frequently use the 
process to negotiate specific “neighborhood services.” Id.  
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employment.”404 The case could be made with hard facts—childcare options 
really do control the jobs, hours, and wages members can accept—or the soft 
reality argued in this article: in alt-bargaining, community concerns, and work 
concerns, really do merge. If that seems like a stretch, consider that interests so 
indirect as to not tangibly affect a particular workplace at all can be protected 
when employees act collectively.405 It also accords with the theory underlying 
scholars’ calls for the Board to label any contested subject mandatory as a matter 
of course: if the union wants to talk about it, it’s related to working conditions.406 
Moreover, although alt-bargaining’s greatest room for growth is in the private 
sector, in the interim an analogous state law progression should also be on the 
table. While public employee collective bargaining statutes are diverse, most 
parrot the NLRA’s language on bargaining scope,407 and all are influenced by the 
NLRB’s analyses.408 Thus, piggybacking is a possibility,409 but if so states would 
have to wrestle with the classic argument against expanding mandatory topics 
where taxpayer dollars are in play: “certain public decisions belong to the public 
and . . . these decisions cannot be submitted to a collective bargaining process 
which restricts the public’s participation.”410 Others have already made good 
arguments against this position,411 but it is particularly unpersuasive in situations 
 
 404.  United Tech., 274 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1070 (1985).  
 405.  All labor law students read Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567–70 (1978), where anti-right-
to-work activism (in a state that was right-to-work already) and pro-minimum wage advocacy (in jobs 
that paid much more already) had a protected nexus with employees’ workplace interests.   
 406.  See, e.g., Cox, supra note 106, at 1086 (“[T]he best course to follow in the future would be to 
reject all new attempts to limit the phrase ‘terms or conditions of employment,’ thus reading it to embrace 
very stipulation which management or labor might advance . . . [F]or if either side feels strongly enough 
about a proposal to press it . . . it is better to have the full discussion . . . than to attempt to conceal the 
issue by legal repression.”); Theodore St. Antoine, Legal Barriers to Worker Participation in Management 
Decision Making, 58 TULANE L. REV. 1301, 1305–07 (1984) (calling this the “wiser course”); Ellen 
Dannin, Collective Bargaining, Impasse, and Implementation of Final Offers: Have We Created a Right 
Unaccompanied by Fulfillment, 19 TOLEDO L. REV. 41, 70–71 (1987) (“Leaders. . .do not remain in office 
to seek to bargain about matters which the rank-and-file perceives to be irrelevant to their desires.”).  
 407.  SETH D. HARRIS ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 703 (2013) (“[A] clear majority of the states that permit public employees to 
bargain collectively use [the NLRA’s] model.”).  
 408.  MARTIN H. MALIN, ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 458 
(2011) (“The private sector’s history and terminology has directly affected the development of private 
sector law, even in jurisdictions rejecting private sector scope of bargaining doctrine.”). See also San Jose 
Peace Officer’s Ass’n. v. San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d 935, 942–43 (Cal. 1978) (“[B]ecause of the similarities 
in language between the MMBA and the National Labor Relations Act federal precedents provide useful 
analogies in determining the parameters of the phrase ‘wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment.’”).  
 409.  Other approaches include providing an exclusive list of mandatory topics or borrowing the 
NLRA’s language while also adding or subtracting specific subjects. See, e.g., Iowa Code. Ann. § 20.9 
(providing a 16 point list); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.215 (removing subjects while requiring 
bargaining “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”); 43 Pa. Stat. 
§ 1101.702 (adding subjects while requiring bargaining “on policy matters affecting wages, hours and 
terms and conditions of employment”).   
 410.  Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 265, 274 (1987). 
 411.  See, e.g., Joseph E. Slater, The Rise and Fall of SB-5: The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in 
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where the electorate has actually formulated many of the demands. That’s pool 
voting.412 
The second major challenge is that pool arrangements have faced mixed legal 
receptions. International Paper’s pool violated good faith because ratification 
was contingent on voting results at other units, which the Board labeled “an 
extraneous,” meaning permissive, consideration.413 The Sixth Circuit agreed but 
was more concerned with the pool’s potential to inject “undue delay” into 
negotiations.414 The envisioned pool is contingent on nothing but the standard 
single tally of unit members—plus others invited to join.  The rise of remote 
electronic balloting in internal union elections suggests it could be over in a day.415 
When pools have been approved, it has been because the Board identifies a 
compelling “community of interest” among the constituents,416 and that is alt-
bargaining’s very nature. 
Since those decisions involved only cross-sections of union voters, a 
community pool might also raise novel questions about third-party participation 
in bargaining. In general, a union’s negotiating team can include “outsiders” for 
“technical advice” or limited inter-union coordination, but not where they are 
“so tainted with conflict or so patently obnoxious”417  as to be more about 
“mischief”418 than good faith deliberations. Bringing a supervisor or corporate 
competitor to the table meets that bar,419 as does inviting “observers” represented 
by another union to convince them to decertify and join-up with the bargaining 
union.420 Here, the motivation all around is a completed agreement, not 
disruption or chicanery. The third-parties are not even in the room and their 
interest in the proceedings is transparent and genuine. They are, after all, voters. 
Further, there are good arguments—overlooked in International Paper and 
elsewhere—that pools should never be policed. The usual principle, for example, 
is that unions can approve agreements any way they want.421 Ratification votes 
need not be held at all, and if they are the rules are limited primarily by provisions 
 
Historical and Political Context, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 473, 499-501 (2012). 
 412.  If Borg-Warner and many of its state equivalents do not fall, it is worth noting that “permissive” 
means what it says: there’s always a chance. Indeed, for some scholars there is “little practical difference 
between a mandatory and a permissive demand because bargaining outcomes depend upon bargaining 
power and pressures and not upon technical legal distinctions.” June Miller Weisberger, The Appropriate 
Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 
WIS. L. REV. 685, 692–93 (1977). That, it seems, is one of the lessons of the Chicago Teachers Union’s 
experience. 
 413.  309 N.L.R.B. at 44-45.  
 414.  Kobell v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 965 F.2d 1401, 1408-09 (6th Cir.1992).  
 415.  U.S. DOL, Office of Labor-Management Standards, OLMS Compliance Tip, Electing Union 
Officers Using Remote Electronic Voting Systems (Oct. 2016).   
 416.  Lynchberg Foundry Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 773, 777, 779 (1971). 
 417.  Gen. Elec. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 253, 254–56 (1968). 
 418.  BHC NW Psychiatric Hosp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (2017). 
 419.  Gen. Elec. Co.,173 N.L.R.B. at 254–55. 
 420.  BHC NW Psychiatric Hosp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (2017). 
 421.  Lynchberg Foundry Co., 192 N.L.R.B. at 776–77 (suggesting that ratification issues are “not 
‘cognizable’ under the Act”).   
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in the union’s own constitution.422 And as Julius Getman and Ray Marshall have 
said, pools are pressure tactics.423 Expanding the franchise may happen to delay 
or diversify the topics under discussion,424 but the point is to hold the line on 
minimum terms, organize outsiders, or attract new allies to the fight. That puts 
pools beyond the scope of good faith remedies and into the rough-and-tumble of 
economic weaponry that, under NLRB v. Insurance Agents, the government must 
ignore.425 
Other legal issues reflect problems endemic to the law itself. One could argue 
there is no pool without a proposed contract, there is no proposed contract 
without a union, and without better organizing and bargaining remedies it is 
fanciful to imagine unions, contracts, or pools on any meaningful scale. All true. 
Changes are needed at pretty much every step of the unionization timeline.426 
Alt-bargaining’s immediate moral, though, seems to be that opportunities lurk in 
the shadows of bad law and even no law, and crowds are the flashlights. As law 
reform awaits, the more light, the better. 
Finally, a host of practical questions exist. In advocacy organizations, 
membership can be slippery. Who should be allowed to vote? Balancing 
participation levels with rights to organizational governance is a recurring 
challenge for many groups,427 but that also means that most already have internal 
policies that could be the basis for self-administered “voter registration” rules. 
Thus, inclusion on a mailing list, proof of attendance at the holiday party, or 
employment at a foundation that helps fund the organization are unlikely to 
trigger ballot access. On the other hand, dues payers, graduates of a formal on-
boarding process, or regular involvement in events, meetings, or actions—all 
 
 422.  Ackley v. W. Conf., 958 F.2d 1463, 1466, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992). For this reason, even 
unconventional restrictions like turn-out minimums and pre-election information limits are generally 
valid. Id. See also Mike Schneider, After UPS contract vote, Teamsters feel betrayed, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2018) (“54% of the ballots were ‘no’ votes, but under a Teamster rule, a rejection requires 2/3 
of the voters to vote down the contract when less than 1/2 of the eligible members participate [thus 
ratifying the contract].”).   
 423.  Getman & Marshall, supra note 363, at 1890 n. 325, n. 327.  
 424.  As Getman and Marshall note, so might strikes or lockouts. Id.  
 425.  Id. The same argument has been made with respect to third-party participation in bargaining. 
Stephen B. Goldberg, Coordinated Bargaining Tactics of Unions, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 898, 900–02 
(1969).  
 426.  Thankfully, serious efforts are underway. See, e.g., Clean Slate Project, Rebalancing Economic 
and Political Power: A Clean Slate for the Future of Labor Law, Labor and Worklife Program, Harvard 
Law School, https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/clean-slate-project [https://perma.cc/BX3A-QTQY] (“The 
Clean Slate Project. . . is building a policy agenda to reconstruct labor law in order to rebalance our 
economy and politics.”). Brishen Rogers & Kate Andrias, Rebuilding Worker Voice in Today’s Economy, 
ROOSEVELT INST. (Aug. 2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/rebuilding-worker-voice-todays-economy/ 
[https://perma.cc/76A6-5T8R]. 
 427.  Sameer M. Ashar’s and Catherine L. Fisk’s contribution to this symposium provides an 
especially thoughtful long-form consideration of the struggles advocacy organizations face in balancing 
activism with organizational voice. Worker Center Governance, Voice, and Autonomy, 82 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 3, at 141 (2019). See also GORDON, supra note 84, at 112–47 (2005) (discussing 
the same issue in the context of an early worker center).   
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things that contribute to “membership” at many community organizations 
today—might make the cut.428 
A more difficult issue concerns demands. Unions make the proposals, but 
should they feel obligated to offer every idea suggested by a community group? 
Very recent experiments with members-only bargaining highlight a real risk that 
the union could be presented with bad faith, regressive, or even anti-worker 
demands.429 For that reason, unions should have the discretion to pick and choose 
between various community-based proposals. While this raises the specter of top-
down, unilateral, or authoritarian decision-making, union leadership has reasons 
both to be maximally inclusive and to avoid instigating grassroots opposition 
from outsiders with sound interests in the negotiation. Knowing that the union is 
most likely to present demands it believes will generate substantial external 
pressure on the company would also motivate groups to carefully vet and 
promote broad enthusiasm for potential proposals. 
Ultimately, this Part’s goal is to offer an optimistic sketch of how an emerging 
approach to bargaining might evolve, not an accounting of hypothetical 
procedure. But like anything ambitious, surely the answers to these sorts of 
questions are likely to come through time and experience, trial and error. That, 
of course, is what welcomed alt-labor—and now alt-bargaining—to the 
workplace in the first place. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
        On January 22, 2019, an “overwhelming supermajority” of the thirty-
thousand members of the United Teachers Los Angeles voted to end a week-
long strike.430 Asked if they “won,” sixth-grade teacher Ingrid Villeda replied, 
“We got almost everything.”431 The walkout didn’t impact the district’s pay 
proposal a penny,432 but Villeda wasn’t referring to wages anyway. Members’ 
 
 428.  See, e.g., Ashar & Fisk, supra note 427, at 165–67 (describing a variety of “different membership 
models” in worker centers); GORDON, supra note 84, at 71 (“Only graduates of the course were eligible 
to become members.”); Jobs with Justice, Our History (describing the “Jobs with Justice Pledge” that 
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demands included an immigrant defense fund, transforming vacant district-
owned land into affordable housing, and support for a cap on charter schools.433 
Three months before, 24,000 University of California truckers, landscapers, and 
food service workers revived a tactic long left for dead, the mass sympathy strike 
in support of someone else’s contract.434 West Virginia’s labor laws haven’t 
changed but neither have the teachers, who in February 2019 struck—and won—
once again.435 
        Whether these and other like-campaigns will continue to multiply is an 
open question. Given the returns so far, they just might, raising the possibility 
that the next transition in bargaining trends could be the simplest: alt-bargaining 
might just lose the “alt” part. 
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